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What Next in the Middle East?

One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly.  Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history.  It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage.  We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing.  Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power.  Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel —  and potentially the Gulf Arab states  —  with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack.  Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran.  Yahyah Sinwar remains at large;  Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages;  and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed.  Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond.  As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues.  Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers.  That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated  inventory of up to 150,000 missiles.  Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas.  What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight.  As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability.  Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran.  Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated.  Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled.  Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm.  The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank.  Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters.  It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp.  The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq.  Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7.  That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage.  This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs.  A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent.  In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression.  Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles.  Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed.  Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority.  In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune.  If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future.  In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government.  It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Learn from History or Lose

Divining the future of European-American relations is particularly difficult when so many Western nations face contentious, rapidly changing domestic politics. In America, the one certainty is that there will be a new president on January 20, 2025, although we cannot confidently predict who. Since neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris have clear national security views, the prospect is for more confusion and disarray. Recent European elections have also produced inconclusive results, with more ahead. In such circumstances, taking a longer view of recent US-European relations may tell us more than speculating about transitory election results. A convenient starting point is the West’s victory in the Cold War. Today, few remember the Cold War theory of “convergence,” which held that communism and capitalism would gradually grow more alike, with peaceful relations emerging as socio-economic systems shed many differences. In short, pro-convergence advocates saw a world not too hot and not too cold, but just one large, happy social democracy.

Instead, Ronald Reagan proposed, “We win and they lose.” To the dismay of the chattering class worldwide, he was right. Unfortunately, when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the West drew exactly the wrong conclusions. Analysts proclaimed “the end of history,” with “globalization” sweeping away geopolitical conflict. Former enemies like Russia and China would be merely economic competitors. NATO members could, therefore, reduce their defense budgets dramatically without fear and spend the resulting “peace dividend” on welfare programs rather than weapons systems. In America, Bill Clinton won the 1992 presidential election under the mantra “It’s the economy, stupid,” implying no need to worry about outmoded geostrategic factors.

Fantasies like “global governance” emerged, recalling post-World War II ideas of “world government,” and imagining that the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly would arise from their Cold War stupor to function as originally intended. New multilateral institutions like the International Criminal Court, and the ICC, were conjured, as if the failures of the International Court of Justice and other transnational tribunals could be ignored.

Many Europeans became absorbed in transforming the Common Market into “ever closer union,” as in a religious crusade. This process began before Cold War victory, but accelerated via the Maastricht Treaty, with the geographic term “Europe” substituted for “European Union” as if Nirvana had already been reached. As EU member governments ceded sovereignty to Brussels, they thought helpfully they would cede some of America’s as well to the UN and other international bodies like the ICC. Instead, Americans disagreed, viewing collective-defense alliances as fundamentally different from other multilateral organizations. A part from traditional politico-military alliances, the US tended toward unilateralist rather than multilateralist approaches, which remains true today. Even presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden made no effort for America to join the ICC, although they cooperated with it more than Presidents George W.Bush and Donald Trump.

No end of history in sight

The end of history, globalization, and global governance embodied a new, worldwide convergence theory, which proved just as wrong as the original convergence theory. From this conceptual mistake flowed serious real-world consequences for both Europe and North America, albeit often producing differing attitudes and strategies. In particular, mutual mistakes and differences regarding the two principal former adversaries, Russia and China, were significant and remain so today.

The West broadly saw the Soviet Union’s collapse leading inevitably toward democracy and market-oriented economic policies, which Russia attempted in the 1990s. After a decade, however, Russia receded into authoritarianism from which it has never recovered. We failed to predict this outcome and did little to prevent it. Still, in the Cold War’s waning days, when Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she could “do business” with Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan warned Europe generally not to become dependent on Russian oil and gas. Europe ignored this warning to its detriment even before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and even more painfully now. Europe, ironically, clung to Cold War paradigms as Washington abandoned them, particularly on arms-control issues.

Wrong on China

Our mistakes on China were even more profound and continued well into this century. There were two foundational errors, both based on the belief that Deng Xiaoping’s mid[1]1980s economic reforms would produce lasting change in China, particularly sustained economic growth and a rising middle class. Few outsiders perceived that Deng was not permanently abandoning communist theory, but making tactical changes to overcome the human and material devastation of Mao Tse-tung’s Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. We took Deng’s admonition for China to “hide and bide” as a sign of appropriate modesty, rather than seeing the real meaning of “hide your strength and bide your time.” We see it now, to our dismay. The first mistake was to predict China would accept the existing international norms and pro[1]cesses in international trade and more broadly that Beijing would engage in a “peaceful rise,” and would be a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs. The exact opposite was true. China’s economic growth fueled its unprecedented full-spectrum arms buildup in peacetime, from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to creating a blue-water navy, to war-fighting capabilities in space and cyberspace. Our second mistake was believing that China’s growing economy would lead to democratization at all levels of government. Precisely the opposite has happened. The Communist Party has strengthened its control, and Xi Jinping is China’s most powerful leader since Mao, with the opposition fragmented and underground. So much for democratization.

Unfortunately, Europe and the United States perceived the rising threats from Russia and China as well as nuclear proliferation threats of rogue states like Iran and North Korea in significantly different ways.

Consider what comes next, starting with China and the so-called “pivot” to Asia. In recent years, both Presidents Trump and Biden have imposed sanctions and tariffs against China, in part for reasons of pure protectionism but also because of Chinese theft of intellectual property and because of the weaponization of companies like Huawei and ZTE. Europe has been harder than expected to convince of the severity of Beijing’s threat despite ample evidence. Of course, it took the U.S. time to grasp the reality, and we are fortunate Australia and New Zealand saw it as early as they did. Nonetheless, Europe’s dependence on China’s market, reminiscent of its reliance on Russian oil and gas, remains a significant obstacle to cooperating effectively against the threat. Japan, South Korea, and others along China’s Indo-Pacific periphery have responded with far greater alacrity.

Politically and militarily, the threat is hardly distant. For over ten years, China has sought to engorge nearly the entire South China Sea. China is not kidding, building air and naval bases on rocks and reefs that are normally only inches above water. States like Vietnam and the Philippines see exactly what China is up to, and so must the West. Taiwan is most often mentioned as a Chinese target, with good reason. Taiwan’s citizens have a functioning democracy, and having seen what happened to freedom in Hong Kong, have no intention of suffering the same fate. Taiwan is a major global trading partner, and its manufacture of highly sophisticated chips for telecommunications and information-technology applications makes it critical for the global and especially Western economies. Fortunately, acting effectively now can strengthen Taiwan’s defenses and its political ties to the West, thereby deterring China before it launches a military conflict. The next few years are extremely dangerous, which East Asia already fully understands.

America’s “pivot” to Asia was an Obama brainchild, reflecting both Beijing’s growing threat, and Obama’s fatigue with Middle Eastern wars against terrorism. Today, even some Republicans, including Vice Presidential nominee J. D. Vance, believe America must concentrate its limited resources against Chinese belligerence in Asia and mostly leave defending Europe and the Middle East to the nations in those regions. This theory is wrong and dangerous on many levels, not least of all because America’s capabilities, allowed to weaken after the Cold War, can certainly be restored.

An Asia-only focus misses the critical point that reducing the US presence in Europe and the Middle East would invite China and Russia to fill the vacuum, as they have already started to do. Ignoring the China-Russia axis and its ability to support its members’ respective objectives is a fatal weakness to a Washington strategy focusing nearly exclusively on threats in Asia. The China-Russia threat is global, and so must be America’s and Europe’s response.

The threat from Russia

Turning to Russia, French President Emmanuel Macron called NATO “brain dead,” even though NATO allies were fully consulted, and indeed concurred because of consistent Russian violations of INF obligations. Macron’s criticism followed a long line of French thinking that rests on the view that the EU should have its own defense capabilities as a way of easing the United States out of a major role in Europe. That, at least, is how the United States sees it, on a bipartisan basis. Macron may get what he asks for if Trump is elected in November, because there is little doubt he would withdraw from NATO at an opportune moment, as he almost did in 2018.

Just over two years after Macron’s “brain dead” comment, Russia attacked Ukraine, extending its 2014incursion.NATOrespondedwith near unanimity to provide Ukraine with lethal, financial, and other assistance. Although there is considerable debate about the strategic efficacy of NATO’s response and outliers like Hungary and Turkey have sympathized with Russia, NATO’s support for Ukraine’s fierce defense has clearly prevented a Russian victory. Sweden and Finland abandoned decades of Cold War-era neutrality to become NATO members.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that China provides Russia with considerable support for its invasion through significantly increased purchases of Russian oil and gas, facilitating financial flows through China’s banking system to avoid international sanctions, and providing other material assistance for Russia’s war effort. Outliers of the China-Russia axis like North Korea and Iran also provide military supplies for Moscow to use against Kyiv. This tangible evidence shows how the emerging Chinese-Russian alliance works against vital Western interests.

Europe needs to do more

Nonetheless, the virus of isolationism now circulating in the US, caused in substantial measure by Trump, sees Europe as unwilling to carry its fair share of the burden. At some point, Trump’s simplistic views might prevail even if he loses in November, as Americans tire of French carping and German and others’ unwillingness to hit the 2 per cent GDP defense spending target consistently. This would be tragic, because opposing the emerging Beijing-Moscow axis means defense spending, urgently and inevitably, must rise above the 2014 Cardiff 2 per cent commitment for NATO members. Indeed, Washington must return to Reagan-era defense-spending levels of 5 – 6 per cent of GDP, meaning European NATO states will have to increase to 4 per cent or beyond. This is hardly the time to talk about alternative European defense arrangements.

All this tells us that the illusions that arose at the end of the Cold War must finally be laid to rest. The lions are not lying down with the lambs any time soon.

This article was first published in European Voices on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Operation Grim Beeper

Israel’s stunning attacks on Hezbollah via exploding pagers and walkie-talkies demonstrate both the creativity and cunning of its intelligence and defense forces, and their capacity to strike deep into the heart of its adversaries’ domains.  The casualties among Hezbollah’s top leadership (and allies, like Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon) plus the significant near-term degradation of Hezbollah’s internal command-and-control, make it conspicuously vulnerable.

For Americans, the death of senior Hezbollah leader Ibrahim Aqeel is especially significant.  He was responsible for the 1983 bombings of the US embassy in West Beirut, and of barracks for US Marines and French soldiers participating in a multilateral peacekeeping force, at the government of  Lebanon’s invitation.  At least partial justice has been done.

Together with the recent elimination of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyah in a supposedly secure compound in Tehran, Israel has almost certainly unnerved Iran, its principal enemy, as well as the terrorist proxies directly targeted.  While the future is uncertain, now is a perfect opportunity for Israel to take far more significant reprisals against Iran and all its terrorist proxies for the “Ring of Fire” strategy.  Iran’s nuclear-weapons program may now finally be at risk.

Where does the Middle East battlefield now stand?

After “Operation Grim Beeper,” as many now call it, Jerusalem launched major strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.  Whether these strikes have concluded, or whether they are the opening phases of a much larger anti-terrorist efforts, is not clear.  These and other recent kinetic strikes have caused further damage to Hezbollah’s leadership and its offensive capacity.

Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s extraordinary arsenal of missiles, largely supplied or financed by Iran, plus their ground forces and tunnels networks in the Bekka Valley and elsewhere in Lebanon, make it a continuing threat, more dangerous near-term to Israel than even Iran. The CIA publicly estimates the terrorists could have “as many as 150,000 missiles and rockets of various types.”  Many believe it is a matter of simple self-preservation that Israel must neutralize Hezbollah before any significant military steps are taken against Iran itself.

Since October 8, the day after Hamas’s barbaric attack on Israel, Hezbollah’s constant missile and artillery barrages into northern Israel have forced approximately 60,000 citizens to evacuate their residences, farms and businesses.  Because of the extensive economic dislocation, and the continuing danger of further destruction of the abandoned properties, on September 16, Israel declared that returning those forced to flee from the north to be a national war goal.  That could well signal further strikes.  Israel has maintained near-perfect operational security for nearly a year;  no one on the outside can predict with certainty what is coming.

As for Hamas, a less-reported but equally significant development is that the Biden administration seems to have largely given up hope of negotiating a cease-fire in the Gaza conflict, at least before November’s presidential election.  In fact, Israel and Hamas had opposing goals that could not be compromised.  Israel was prepared to accept a brief cease fire and releasing some Palestinian prisoners, in exchange for its hostages, whereas Hamas wanted a definitive end to hostilities, with all Israeli forces withdrawing from Gaza.  Almost certainly, there was never to be a meeting of minds.

Accordingly, Israel’s  pursuit of Hamas’s remaining top leadership and the ongoing efforts to degrade and destroy its combat capabilities will continue.  Moreover, operations to destroy Hamas’s extraordinarily extensive fortifications under Gaza will also continue, aimed at totally destroying every cubic inch of the tunnel system.  Thus, at least for now, Iran’s initial sally in the Ring of Fire strategy is on the way to ignominious defeat.  Tehran’s dominance in Gaza has brought only ruin.

By contrast, Yemen’s Houthi terrorists, with Iran’s full material support and political direction, continue to close the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage to most traffic, while also targeting US drones in international airspace.  This blockage us causing significant economic hardships.  In the region, Egypt is suffering major declines in government revenue from lost Suez Canal transit fees, which can only increase economic hardships for its civilian population.  Worldwide, the higher costs of goods that must now be transported around the Horn of Africa are burdening countless countries, all with impunity for the Houthis and Iran.

Allowing Tehran and its terrorist proxies to keep these vital maritime passages closed is flatly unacceptable.  Even before the United States was independent, freedom of the seas was a key principle of the colonies’ security.  As with many other aspects of Iran’s Ring of Fire strategy, the Biden administration has been wringing its hands, not taking or supporting decisive  action to clear these sea lines of communication.  Whether the next US President continues the current ineffective approach will obviously not be known until after January 20, 2025.

Similarly, the United States has failed to exact significant retribution against Iran and the Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, also largely armed and equipped by Iran, that have conducted over 170 attacks on American civilian and military personnel since October 7.  The Biden administration has effectively left these diplomats, soldiers and contractors at continuing risk, especially as tensions and increased military activity in the Ring of Fire area of operations escalate.  An Iranian or Shia militia attack that inflicted serious American casualties, which is unfortunately entirely possible due to the Biden administration’s passivity, could prompt major US retaliation, perhaps directly against Iran.

Tehran’s mullahs remain the central threat to peace and security in the Middle East.  As its terrorist surrogates are steadily degraded, and the Ring of Fire Strategy increasingly unravels, the prospects for direct attacks on Iran’s air defenses, its oil-and-gas production facilities, its military installations, and even its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs steadily increase,  Moreover, as Iran’s deeply discontented civilian population sees increasingly that the ayatollahs are more interested in religious extremism than the welfare of their fellow citizens, internal dissent  against the regime will increase.  The real question, therefore, is whether Iran’s Islamic Revolution will outlast its current Supreme Leader.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Effects of the Haniyah Assassination

Ayatollah Khamenei should increase his security protections.  Whoever assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in Iran’s supposedly secure capital sent an unmistakable message to Khamenei, Iran’s citizens, its terrorist proxies, and the world at large:  No one is safe in Iran.  

Not the Supreme Leader, not Qassem Soleimani, and not the lowliest Basiji militiaman.  This grim reality should lead all Iranians not lost in religious fanaticism or authoritarian ideology to reconsider their own future under the mullahs.  Whether Israel (or whomever did the deed) used a bomb planted two months before detonating during Haniyeh’s visit, or fired a precision-guided weapon, the result was the same.  Haniyeh is dead, and Iran stands humiliated.

What now?  Almost a month after Haniyeh’s demise, Iran has not retaliated, although Israel’s pre-emptive August 25 strike against Hezbollah may have thwarted part of Iran’s plan.  The situation remains fluid.  The United States, committed to defend Israel, had acted earlier, deploying the USS Abraham Lincon carrier strike group to the Middle East, overlapping with the USS Theodore Roosevelt group before it returned home.  Also now on station is the nuclear-powered USS Georgia, a cruise-missile submarine.  Together with already present American military capabilities, this is a force to be reckoned with, offensive and defensive.  Its presence alone could be delaying Iran’s response(https://www.wsj.com/opinion/israel-iran-u-s-force-pentagon-biden-administration-gaza-hamas-dcf393a1?mod=opinion_feat1_editorials_pos3).

While no one can ignore a US carrier strike group in their backyard, the main cause for Iran’s hesitation in again attacking Israel, as it did on April 13 with 320 missiles and drones, is the decidedly unpleasant strategic conundrum it faces.  Humiliated, presumably by Israel, the mullahs must undertake devastating reprisals to reestablish credibility and deterrence.  This time, a pinprick attack on Israel, which is all Hezbollah’s Sunday attack amounted to, will not suffice.  

Moreover, some observers are dubious about Iran’s April strike, asserting that it warned Israel in advance, thereby enabling Israel’s defenses to blunt the assault.  In turn, in President Biden’s words, Jerusalem could “take the win” and respond minimally.  This analysis is speculative, and there are reports Iran suffered massive failures in its ballistic-missiles launches(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-launches-drone-attack-toward-israel-idf-says/).  Whichever version is true, Iran caused only minimal casualties and physical damage.  That will not be nearly enough this time, whether the response comes from Iran itself, Hezbollah, or another terrorist proxy.  

However, a truly punishing attack is what creates Iran’s strategic conundrum.  Iran fears that an emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not bend to Washington’s pressure this time, as he did in April.  With Biden now a lame duck, and the US presidential election in doubt, Israel could conclude that this is precisely the moment to launch a debilitating response, not just take out a few missile-launching sites.  To start, Jerusalem could level Iran’s air-defense capabilities.  Then, Netanyahu could target Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs;  its oil terminals and loading facilities in the Gulf;  or major IRGC and regular military facilities countrywide.  This time, the Supreme Leader might also be a target.

If Israel caused serious damage, the entire 1979 Islamic Revolution could be in jeopardy, which the ayatollahs will not want to risk.  Their hold on power domestically has never been so unsteady, with substantial, long-brewing political, economic, and social discontent.  Wrestling with the competing imperatives of striking Israel savagely but not being overthrown is paralyzing the regime’s decision-making.  Trying to make a virtue out of necessity, Tehran claims to be withholding revenge to avoid jeopardizing the Qatari-led effort to establish a Hamas-Israel cease-fire in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages.  With the negotiations seemingly stalled, the mullahs welcome further delay, not out of altruism for the combatants in Gaza, but because it affords Tehran precious additional time to untangle its strategic dilemma.  

If the cease-fire negotiations do collapse, Iran will have no satisfactory way to escape the unpleasant alternatives it faces.  That is a problem of its own making, having forged its “ring of fire strategy” against Israel over decades, and for reasons still unclear, launching it with Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack.  Tehran may have miscalculated the effect of Hamas’s blitz, which clearly did not crush Israel’s resolve.  Instead, Netanyahu is now close to achieving his stated goal of eliminating Hamas’s political and military capabilities.  

Moreover, with chaos in Gaza so extensive, Israel can now reopen the decades-old issue of what to do next with Gazan civilians, and whether resettlement to third countries is now in order.  Following World War II, tens of millions of refugees who, for whatever reasons, could not return to their home countries were resettled.  Only Palestinian were exempted from this outcome, treated instead as hereditary refugees, weapons against the very existence of Israel.  That already-obsolete plan met its demise thanks to the Iran-Hamas October 7 assault.

Iran could choose to do very little, hoping its reputation as a regional power with nuclear capabilities will not suffer greatly.  Its terrorist surrogates, however, will then question the basic terms of their dependence on Iran.  If the ayatollahs can’t protect terrorist leaders in Tehran, what are their incentive to do Tehran’s bidding in a dangerous and uncertain future?  Might not Tehran’s timidity inspire Iran’s domestic opposition?  Seeing weakness externally, might not the regime’s domestic enemies conclude that their moment to oppose the legitimacy and very existence of the mullahs’ regime is at hand?

The clock is ticking for the ayatollahs.  They do not have forever to decide.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on August 26, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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What Netanyahu’s visit showed about the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to America last week reflected long-term pluses and minuses for the U.S.-Israel relationship. The historical relationship between Israel and the Democratic Party hit its lowest point ever, while that between Republicans and Israel has never been stronger. Driving these developments are tectonic shifts of power and demographics among Democrats and, even more importantly, tectonic shifts in Israeli public opinion about how to achieve lasting peace and security.

Netanyahu’s address to a joint session of Congress echoed both alterations. His Gaza objectives were clear: “Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and its rule in Gaza and bring all our hostages home. That’s what total victory means, and we will settle for nothing less.”

The prime minister rightly laid responsibility for the threats facing Israel on Iran, the principal menace to Middle Eastern stability. This reality has still not sunk in with Democrats, particularly in the Biden White House. In Israel today, whatever Netanyahu’s personal popularity, there is little debate on these points.

America’s core national interest in supporting Israel against Iran and its terrorist surrogates is more than religious, historical and cultural. Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats both currently manifest themselves in the Hamas war against Israel, the “little Satan,” but Tehran also targets America, the “great Satan.” Gaza is not the main battleground, but merely one front of Tehran’s threat, which Netanyahu spelled out clearly, yet again. And yet again, the Democratic establishment didn’t get it. Fortunately for Israel, most Americans do.

Netanyahu’s meeting with President Biden was apparently workmanlike, focusing on Biden’s continuing, misbegotten pursuit of a cease-fire-for-hostages deal between Hamas and Israel. Ominously for Netanyahu, however, Biden has already moved far away from the “ironclad” support for Israel he pledged shortly after Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7 attack. Inevitably, the leaders’ meeting reflected the unrelenting, unprecedented pressure the White House has put on Jerusalem to end the Gaza conflict.

When still a candidate for reelection, Biden wanted the Middle East (and Ukraine) off the front pages, hoping to conceal the spreading global chaos caused by his own foreign policy’s grave weaknesses. Biden also wanted to avoid offending tender Iranian or Russian sensitivities, lest increased global oil prices reignite inflation, thereby diminishing his waning chances of victory in November. Although Biden is now a lame duck, his and Vice President Kamala Harris’s interests still converge on this point.

For Israel, Biden truly is a transitional president, the last vestige of President Harry Truman’s pride that the U.S. was first to recognize Israel’s independence. Those days are over. As Netanyahu said to Congress, Biden described himself as “a proud Irish-American Zionist.” Vice President Harris is not a proud Zionist of any variety, which, if not already clear, became so in her Netanyahu meeting, evidenced by her frosty manner and both her public and private remarks.

Afterward, Harris said, “let’s get the deal done so we can get a cease-fire to end the war.” Easy to say if eliminating Hamas’s threat (let alone Iran’s) isn’t your foundational objective. But Harris wasn’t finished. She proclaimed that she would “not be silent” about suffering Gazans, although if suffering Gazans were her true concern, she would be pressuring Hamas, not Israel.

Hamas, after all, turned Gaza into an underground fortress at the expense of its civilians, whom it has used ruthlessly as human shields. Failing to acknowledge this reality effectively endorses a terrorist veto against Israel’s right of self-defense. Let Harris explain that during the campaign’s final 100 days.

The Democrats’ split with Israel mirrors Britain’s new Labour Party government. Labour has a long, disturbing history of antisemitism and doubtful support for Israel, and once again disdains the Jewish state. Last week, Prime Minister Keir Starmer pleased Labour’s hard left by lifting U.K. objections to the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and others. Another question for reporters to ask Harris: Does she support Biden’s continuing opposition to the warrants?

Netanyahu’s meeting with Donald Trump was no picnic either. The day before, Trump said, “I want him to finish up [in Gaza] and get it done quickly. They are getting decimated with this publicity. Israel is not really good at public relations, I’ll tell you that.” It suits Trump politically to pretend that his personal relationship with Netanyahu was always good, and the meeting provided Trump an excellent opportunity to recall his presidency’s pro-Israel decisions, like moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The risk underlying these comments, like similar Trump remarks recently, is not abstract concern about Israel losing the propaganda war with Iran and Hamas. Instead, Trump fears that his pro-Israel stance is now bringing him political costs rather than benefits, which is not how Trump thinks the world should work. His interests alone dictate his political positions, so Israel needs to shape up and stop troubling his already difficult presidential campaign.

Post-visit, Netanyahu and Israel have a better picture of the troubling tendencies of America’s three most important political leaders before Election Day. Whether Harris or Trump wins, Jerusalem’s relations with Washington will be more difficult. This is not the road America should be on, but these are the candidates we have, and one of them will prevail in November.

This article was first published in The Hill on July 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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JD Vance is a disturbing choice for Vice-President

Although widely expected, Donald Trump’s selection of  J.D. Vance as his  running mate is nonetheless profoundly disturbing in its implications for American foreign policy in a Trump presidency. Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater are turning in their graves.
Describing the substantive defects in the Trump-Vance approach could fill many pages of newsprint, but – taking Ukraine as an example – both men are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China.  
It is beyond debate that years of inadequate defense budgets have made Washington’s job harder. Bill Clinton’s eagerness (along with European governments) to cut military budgets after the Soviet Union’s collapse (the so-called “peace dividend”) and Barack Obama’s debilitating military budget cuts still need repair. But these are failures of will and resolve, typical of Democratic foreign policies, not inadequate assets. Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength.
Ironically, Trump rejects Vance’s foundational ‘logic’. He is apparently unwilling even to defend Taiwan. As re centently said: “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything. [It’s] 9,500 miles away. It’s 68 miles away from China…China’s a massive piece of land, they could just bombard it…Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”
Isolationism combined with such incoherence is a toxic brew for US national security. But Vance’s nomination has additional implications beyond his and Trump’s poorly conceived statements.  
In Vance, Trump unmistakably named his heir-apparent, which he had heretofore resisted.  Many first-term officials and members of  Congress had hoped for that designation, but their hopes have now been dashed. The new reality may persuade many disappointed aspirants not to serve in a second Trump term.  They know that a VP’s influence in decision-making can be profound, especially when his personal chemistry with the President is as strong as that between Vance and Trump.  Working in the West Wing, just yards away from the Oval Office gives the VP’ a customary advantage of being the last person to speak with a President before a major decision. These advantages are not overcome even by running great Cabinet empires like Defense or State.
Accordingly, the small army of political figures considering becoming candidates for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination might be best served by remaining in Congress or the private sector rather than joining a second Trump term, allowing them to retain their distance in case of disaster in the next four years,  preserving their 2028 viability.
   Moreover, choosing Vance signals that Trump will not be “normalising” his policy or personnel decision-making in a second term. Non-Trump Republicans hoped desperately during his march to the 2024 nomination that a second Trump term would profit from the mistakes of his first. They longed for four years of consistent policy directions and sound implementation, rather than the first’s transactional, unpredictable neuron flashes.  Unfortunately for that dream, and the country, Trump clearly wants no troublesome subordinates, only yes-men and -women. Vance isn’t going to modulate Trump’s behavior.  He is no Mike Pence.
Trump wants undiluted personal loyalty in his post-election government team, at all levels. Vance craved Trump’s endorsement in his 2022 Senate primary, and his help in that year’s general election. He worked for the past two years to get into Trump’s inner circle, adopting his policies as he went.  He has now succeeded. As Chinese Communists describe their relationship with North Korean Communists: Trump and Vance are like lips and teeth.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on July 20, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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The New Iranian President and Donald Trump

Masoud Pezeshkian probably never expected to become Iran’s President, nor did most of his countrymen, nor the outside world.  Whatever the reasons for his success, Pezeshkian’s victory means only that Tehran now shows a smiley face to foreigners rather than a mean face.  Beneath surface appearances, nothing substantive has changed.

Westerners especially have long misunderstood that Iran’s elected Presidency does not hold decisive political power, certainly not on Tehran’s critical national-security priorities like nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and supporting innumerable terrorist groups.  Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, like his predecessor and father of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini.  “Supreme Leader.”  That title tells you everything.

Elections for Iran’s presidency are hardly free and open.  To start, only candidates satisfactory to the Guardian Council may run, and the Council has never been slack in applying rigid ideological standards.  The races are ultimately never more than hardline-hardliners running against moderate-hardliners.  If the Guardian Council had wanted to exclude Pezeshkian from the election, they could have.  If they wanted to ensure he lost, they could have allowed multiple “moderates” in the race and only one “hardliner.”  Instead, they did the opposite, and Pezeshkian prevailed.  If the regime had really been worried about such an outcome, it would simply have stolen the election, as in 2009.  Interestingly, voter turnout figures remain hotly disputed, so we may never know exactly how many people legitimately cast ballots.

Until the regime finally issues a definitive statement on why Pezeshkian’s predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, died in a helicopter crash, questions about regime stability will linger.  Whatever the cause of the crash, Pezeshkian is an accidental President.  For Raisi, the presidency may well have been but a steppingstone, given Khamenei’s age and infirmities.  He had been fingered by the Supreme Leader and others as potentially Iran’s third Supreme Leader upon Khamenei’s death or incapacity.  Pezeshkian, by contrast, seems to be a temporary fill-in, even more of a figurehead than other Presidents, until the key ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard decide how to proceed.

Over 45 years, Iran’s two Supreme Leaders, through successive presidencies, have never deviated from their fundamental national-security precepts:  (1) pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery capabilities;  and (2) creating and enhancing multiple terrorist proxies across the Middle East and globally.  These have been foundational both to Tehran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and its broader aspirations for dominance in the Islamic world.  No mere substitute President is going to obstruct that strategic vision.

What Pezeshkian does for the mullahs is to provide what Russians call “maskirovka”:  camouflage that disguises Iran’s real foreign policy.  Like other puppets and front men Tehran has used over the years, including former Foreign Minister Javid Zarif and Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator now nestled comfortably at Princton, Pezeshkian is a walking, talking disinformation campaign.  Susceptible Westerners, longing for resumed nuclear talks with Iran, now have a straw to grasp at.  Nothing will come from any resumed diplomacy, of course, because there is no sign Iran the Supreme leader has made a strategic decision to change course.

Ironically, therefore, the mullahs have scored a public-relations coup by having an empty suit like Pezeshkian replace Raisi, widely called “the butcher of Tehran” for his judicial role in ordering executions of hundreds (perhaps thousands) of political prisoners.   If Pezeshkian chooses to attend the UN General Assembly opening in New York this September, one can imagine the welcome America’s credulous media and academic institutions will afford him.  He smiles, he waves, he acts informally, perhaps he likes progressive jazz, maybe he drinks a little Scotch whiskey in private (who knows!), he must want to make a deal the United States!

US liberals and the Biden Administration can dream about this scenario, but they may not be in office after November’s election.  Even if they were, of course, the compliant Pezeshkian they imagine would not be making nuclear-weapons policy, nor would his Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, chief negotiator of the 2015 nuclear deal.  Americans are all too apt to succumb to the diplomatic phenomenon known as “mirror imaging,” where negotiators look across the table and see people just like themselves:  reasonable men and women simply looking to find practical solutions to shared problems.  That’s exactly opposite from how the Islamic Revolution views the outside world.

Instead, if Donald Trump wins, now more likely than ever after the failed July 13 assassination attempt, his propensity to treat national-security issues simply as opportunities for making deals could lead to a Trump-Pezeshkian get-together.  French President Emmanuel Macron almost seduced Trump into meeting with Zarif on the margins of the Biarritz G-7 in August, 2019.  Trump’s “zeal for the deal” brought him within an eyelash of seeing Zarif, and foreshadows a contemporary version of that meeting early in a new Trump term.  It may take second place to Trump visiting North Korean leader Kim Jung Un in Pyongyang to reopen nuclear negotiations, but it suits Trump’s singular focus on personal publicity.

Thus, while Pezeshkian’s election as President may not have been conscious Iranian maskirovka, there is no doubt the Supreme Leader and his cohorts can take advantage of the opportunity presented if they so choose.  Such circumstances do not mean a new nuclear deal would emerge, since that would certainly not be Tehran’s negotiating objective.  Instead, the mullahs would be playing for more time, which is uniformly beneficial to would-be nuclear proliferators, hoping to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability, and then to decide how to employ it.  The same would be true for Iran’s terrorist objectives in the region and beyond.  Trump would not even realize he was playing according to the Supreme Leader’s script.

Although the unsuspecting Masoud Pezeshkian may not realize it, he may be exactly the gift the ayatollahs never thought to ask for.

This article was first published in the Independent Arabia on July 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Biden Goes to Extremes to Appease Tehran

The world has truly turned upside down when a U.S. president begs America’s allies to have a United Nations agency go easy on a terrorist nuclear proliferator. The Biden administration’s reported pleading on behalf of Iran isn’t merely a tactical error about yet another biodegradable U.N. resolution. It’s a persistent strategic blindness that existentially threatens key U.S. partners and endangers our own peace and security.

Iran’s largely successful effort to conceal critical aspects of its nuclear-weapons complex from scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western intelligence services is nearing culmination. IAEA reports about Iran’s uranium-enrichment program—and Tehran’s disdain for IAEA inspections, extending over two decades—finally have the Europeans worried.

Instead of welcoming this awakening, President Biden is reportedly lobbying European allies to avoid a tough anti-Iran resolution at this week’s quarterly IAEA board of governors meeting. The administration denies it. But limpness on Iran’s nuclear threat fits the Obama-Biden pattern of missing the big picture, before and after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, including cash-for-hostages swaps with Iran as recently as last year.

Mr. Biden has two objectives. The first is to keep gasoline prices low and foreign distractions to a minimum before November’s election. The second is the Obama-Biden obsession with appeasing Iran’s ayatollahs, hoping they will become less medieval and more compliant if treated nicely. Both objectives are misguided, even dangerous.

Election worries about gas prices have also weakened U.S. sanctions against Russia, which are failing because of their contradictory goals. It simply isn’t possible to restrict Russian revenue while keeping U.S. pump prices low. The ayatollahs don’t worry about elections, but they know weakness when they see it, including Mr. Biden’s relaxed enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

Mr. Biden’s greater mistake is refusing to acknowledge Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy to intimidate Israel and achieve regional hegemony over the oil-producing monarchies and other inconvenient Arab states. The foundational muscle for achieving these quasi-imperial aspirations is Iran’s nuclear program, precisely the issue at the IAEA. Starting in his 2020 campaign, Mr. Biden repeatedly alienated Gulf Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, which felt particularly threatened by his zeal to rejoin the failed 2015 nuclear deal. Mr. Biden’s willingness to exclude Israel and the Arabs from negotiations with Tehran, as Mr. Obama did, convinced Arab governments that Washington was again hopelessly feckless. Israel concurred.

Arab leaders privately see the need to eliminate Tehran’s terrorist proxies. Saying so publicly, however—even quietly—requires political cover, which Washington has failed to provide. The Biden administration could have sought to destroy, not merely inhibit, the Iran-backed Houthis’ capacity to close shipping routes in the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Since the U.S. failed to do so, rising prices from higher shipping costs increase the risk of a de facto Iran-Houthi veto over freedom of the seas. Not surprisingly, Iran now threatens to blockade Israel itself.

Mr. Biden decided to concentrate world attention on Gaza rather than on Iran as the puppet-master. Doing so has helped obscure that Gaza is only one component of the larger ring-of-fire threat. Many Israelis, including several members of the war cabinet, have long focused on the close-to-home threat of Palestinian terrorists rather than the existential threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. This joint failure enabled Tehran’s propaganda to outmatch Jerusalem’s, leaving the false impression of a moral equivalence.

Had the U.S. and Israel explained the barbarity of Oct. 7 in such broader strategic terms, they would necessarily have concentrated attention on Iran’s coming succession crisis. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is old and ailing. President Ebrahim Raisi’s still-unexplained demise has already launched a succession struggle that could transform Iran. The U.S. and its allies should help the Iranian opposition fracture the Islamic Revolution at the top. Instead, Mr. Biden, who couldn’t conceive of overthrowing the ayatollahs, has dispatched envoys to beg Iran not to stir things up further before November.

Sending Tehran what diplomats call a “strong message” from the IAEA isn’t much, but treating Iran as if it calls the shots is far worse. Praying that Mr. Biden wakes up to reality may be the world’s only hope.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on June 4, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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The ICC and the ICJ Manage to Make Things Worse

Intervening last week against Israel’s self-defense actions toward Iran and Hamas, the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice made resolving the war harder.

The courts’ actions are fundamentally illegitimate, and their meddling portends further involvement, which could be even more unhelpful. Despite the troubles the ICC and ICJ are causing, Israel and its allies should not be dissuaded from destroying Hamas’s politico-military capabilities.

The United States is not a party to the ICC’s foundational treaty, having unsigned it in 2002. And over time, Washington has renounced the ICJ’s major jurisdictions, leaving only treaties where the court has never been invoked. Similarly, Israel never joined the ICC and has rejected ICJ jurisdiction on Gaza and West Bank matters. One immediate lesson for both countries is to withdraw completely from any remaining ICJ jurisdictions.

Although Israel is bearing the ICC and ICJ’s wrath for now, Jerusalem has long served as a canary in the coal mine for Washington, giving advance warning of pending threats America may experience later. Faced with Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy, implemented through attacks by Tehran’s terrorist proxies, Israel is acting in self-defense to eliminate Hamas as a fighting force.

Hamas’s barbaric policy of using Gaza’s civilian population as human shields, hoping to spare itself, has incalculably increased the inherent difficulties of urban combat. The terrorists believe that by sacrificing enough civilians, they can mobilize international pressure to stop Israel from achieving its objectives. Provoking investigations by the ICC’s rogue prosecutor and inducing international allies like South Africa to initiate ICJ cases, Hamas aims to increase the political pressure under ostensibly legal guises. Iran and its terrorist allies thereby seek to make Israelis feel increasingly isolated internationally and thereby pressure Jerusalem to back down.

Israelis should not fear being isolated for defending themselves. Who else will defend them if they do not? Jerusalem need not comply with political decrees by courts so illusory they cannot enforce their decisions. Indeed, scrutinizing the ICJ’s May 24 decision and its obtuse, international-legalese wording, Israel concluded it need not change its Gaza military operations. Although widely reported as ordering Israel to cease the Gaza offensive, the ICJ’s operative language actually demands only that Israel “halt its military offensive … which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” Since Israel’s operations target Hamas, not all Palestinians, Israel sees its current approach as legitimate even by ICJ standards. That interpretation may sound Jesuitical, but it also demonstrates yet again why judicial intervention in wars is fanciful at best.

Unfortunately, however, the propaganda consequences look far different. Immediately after the ICC prosecutor announced he sought an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, reporters asked German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s press spokesman if Germany would execute the warrant. The aide replied, “Of course. Yes, we abide by the law.” While Scholz himself later tried to soften the blow, the point had been made.

Propaganda by Iran, its terrorist surrogates, and its leftist supporters worldwide has outmatched Israel’s during this conflict, except for the weeks immediately after Hamas’s Oct. 7 barbarities. Undoubtedly, ICC and ICJ actions will now take center stage in that propaganda, fueled by each new utterance from The Hague.

But the problems are far deeper than mere public relations failures. In America, for example, university protests and surprising polling results show astounding support for Hamas, especially among younger voters. Faculty prejudices have obviously grown worse over time, even as baby boomer professors reach retirement age. Reform of faculty selection and tenure decisions, among other things, is essential in public and private universities alike. This means little near-term, but could be dispositive for the U.S.-Israel special relationship in the long term. In Europe, if anything, anti-Israeli sentiment and outright antisemitism are even worse.

In a perfect world, Israel’s information statecraft and that of its allies would have been more effective from the outset. Surprise attacks, however, do not give targets time to prepare in advance. Media coverage of the ICC and the ICJ has proven the urgent need to explain why their actions are illegitimate. The broader imperative is to explain more effectively, and with greater resources, why Israel is exercising its legitimate right of self-defense against Hamas and Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on May 29, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Repercussions of Raisi’s death

President Ebrahim Raisi’s May 19 death in a helicopter crash has the potential to shatter Iran’s regime and the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself.  Raisi’s obviously unexpected demise was so unnerving and the stakes so high that we cannot yet fully discern the frantic maneuverings and vicious political infighting underway behind the scenes in Tehran.

The critical next step is the regime’s official, definitive statement on the cause of the helicopter crash.  So far, authorities have said only there was no evidence Raisi’s aircraft was attacked (https://apnews.com/article/iran-statement-helicopter-crash-raisi-a19ed365f5f4813c31b3d696acc0a6cb), and the investigation continues. This obviously incomplete explanation is likely intended to buy time and reduce destabilizing speculation, but it cannot be the final word.

Huge political consequences flow from whatever cause is ultimately chosen.  The reality was probably some combination of bad weather, mountainous terrain, pilot error or mechanical malfunction.  Former Foreign Minister Javaid Zarif quickly blamed US sanctions for the lack of spare parts, which is laughable.  Iran has earned hundreds of billions of dollars in international oil sales since Ronald Reagan imposed America’s first sanctions, enough to finance ballistic-missile and nuclear programs and arm countless terrorist groups.  Iran didn’t have enough money to buy new helicopters from its Russian and Chinese friends?

Beyond the obvious non-political causes, Iran could choose to blame the usual foreign suspects (Mossad, CIA) or domestic political, ethnic, or religious opponents.  Assignment of blame could thereby prefigure the leadership struggles already underway, which could explain the delay in saying anything conclusive.  When truth is manipulated, elaborate preparations are often required to destroy conflicting evidence and counterfeit new “evidence.”  Outsiders can only await the final word to assess its impact, if any, on the succession battle.  Meanwhile, in the hours and days after the first reports of the presidential helicopter’s “hard landing,” military and security forces have shored up their defenses against potential unrest or interference from domestic or foreign source (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/world/middleeast/iran-raisi-helicopter-crash.html).

The critical point is the need to select a new Supreme Leader, or at least devise a concrete process for that decision, sooner than anticipated.  Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is approximately 85-years-old and in poor health.  With only two Supreme Leaders since the 1979 revolution, Iran has no established procedure regarding succession.  Many believe the rigged electoral process that brought Raisi to the presidency was intended to establish a more-stable line of succession, with Raisi seamlessly replacing Khamenei at the appropriate time.

Not everyone accepted this ploy, least of all Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who aspires to fill his father’s shoes.  Ironically, the father’s own concerns about establishing a hereditary line of succession, a criticism forcefully made by Mojtaba’s opponents, likely helped propel the notion that the presidency could serve as a stepping stone.  With new presidential elections now set for June 28, it is questionable whether the victor will automatically have the clout to be a top-tier contender to be Supreme Leader.  That means, inevitably, that there could be a plethora of candidates and intense infighting in government circles well ahead of the Supreme Leader’s death, which is likely the only way he will relinquish his office. 

Avoiding uncertainty over the succession is precisely what the regime’s top religious, civil, and military leadership wanted, but it now seems unavoidable.  Widespread politicking, conniving, and worse will widen already-existing splits within Iran’s top leadership and open new ones.  Competing centers of power among the ayatollahs;  leaders in the government’s legislative and judicial branches;  and Revolutionary Guards and regular military commanders already exist or are developing quickly.  The longer the struggle proceeds, the more bitter, more intense, and more protracted it will become.

In terms of raw power, the Revolutionary Guards already constitute a force that can easily resist the weak structures of civil government and even the regular military.  Many characterized the now-deceased Quds Force leader, Qassem Soleimani, as almost a son to Ayatollah Khamenei, with influence far beyond what his official title conveyed.  Given the regime’s unprecedented unpopularity across Iran, because of economic troubles, the discontent of the young people, the outrage caused by Mahsa Amini’s murder eighteen months ago, and longstanding ethnic and religious tensions, the Revolutionary Guards truly are the only reliably loyal shield for the ayatollahs and other regime leaders.

But what if the IRGC fragments?  If Iran’s opposition can drive wedges between Revolutionary Guard leaders, or even within the conventional military, the regime’s near-monopoly of lethal force could be broken.  Disaffected ethnic groups like Kurds and Baluchis could join in as well, raising the prospect of internal clashes, perhaps rising to levels approximating civil war.

Historically, outwardly imposing authoritarian regimes, such as czarist Russia, have often been hollowed out internally long before they fell.  Confronted with determined opponents, they collapsed swiftly.  It is too soon to tell whether the ayatollahs will meet the same fate, but, without doubt, their revolution is now in grave jeopardy.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on May 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

ABOUT JOHN BOLTON

Ambassador John Bolton, a diplomat and a lawyer, has spent many years in public service. He served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005-2006. He was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. In the Reagan Administration, he was an Assistant Attorney General.