Ayatollah Khamenei should increase his security protections.  Whoever assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in Iran’s supposedly secure capital sent an unmistakable message to Khamenei, Iran’s citizens, its terrorist proxies, and the world at large:  No one is safe in Iran.  

Not the Supreme Leader, not Qassem Soleimani, and not the lowliest Basiji militiaman.  This grim reality should lead all Iranians not lost in religious fanaticism or authoritarian ideology to reconsider their own future under the mullahs.  Whether Israel (or whomever did the deed) used a bomb planted two months before detonating during Haniyeh’s visit, or fired a precision-guided weapon, the result was the same.  Haniyeh is dead, and Iran stands humiliated.

What now?  Almost a month after Haniyeh’s demise, Iran has not retaliated, although Israel’s pre-emptive August 25 strike against Hezbollah may have thwarted part of Iran’s plan.  The situation remains fluid.  The United States, committed to defend Israel, had acted earlier, deploying the USS Abraham Lincon carrier strike group to the Middle East, overlapping with the USS Theodore Roosevelt group before it returned home.  Also now on station is the nuclear-powered USS Georgia, a cruise-missile submarine.  Together with already present American military capabilities, this is a force to be reckoned with, offensive and defensive.  Its presence alone could be delaying Iran’s response(https://www.wsj.com/opinion/israel-iran-u-s-force-pentagon-biden-administration-gaza-hamas-dcf393a1?mod=opinion_feat1_editorials_pos3).

While no one can ignore a US carrier strike group in their backyard, the main cause for Iran’s hesitation in again attacking Israel, as it did on April 13 with 320 missiles and drones, is the decidedly unpleasant strategic conundrum it faces.  Humiliated, presumably by Israel, the mullahs must undertake devastating reprisals to reestablish credibility and deterrence.  This time, a pinprick attack on Israel, which is all Hezbollah’s Sunday attack amounted to, will not suffice.  

Moreover, some observers are dubious about Iran’s April strike, asserting that it warned Israel in advance, thereby enabling Israel’s defenses to blunt the assault.  In turn, in President Biden’s words, Jerusalem could “take the win” and respond minimally.  This analysis is speculative, and there are reports Iran suffered massive failures in its ballistic-missiles launches(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-launches-drone-attack-toward-israel-idf-says/).  Whichever version is true, Iran caused only minimal casualties and physical damage.  That will not be nearly enough this time, whether the response comes from Iran itself, Hezbollah, or another terrorist proxy.  

However, a truly punishing attack is what creates Iran’s strategic conundrum.  Iran fears that an emboldened Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not bend to Washington’s pressure this time, as he did in April.  With Biden now a lame duck, and the US presidential election in doubt, Israel could conclude that this is precisely the moment to launch a debilitating response, not just take out a few missile-launching sites.  To start, Jerusalem could level Iran’s air-defense capabilities.  Then, Netanyahu could target Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs;  its oil terminals and loading facilities in the Gulf;  or major IRGC and regular military facilities countrywide.  This time, the Supreme Leader might also be a target.

If Israel caused serious damage, the entire 1979 Islamic Revolution could be in jeopardy, which the ayatollahs will not want to risk.  Their hold on power domestically has never been so unsteady, with substantial, long-brewing political, economic, and social discontent.  Wrestling with the competing imperatives of striking Israel savagely but not being overthrown is paralyzing the regime’s decision-making.  Trying to make a virtue out of necessity, Tehran claims to be withholding revenge to avoid jeopardizing the Qatari-led effort to establish a Hamas-Israel cease-fire in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages.  With the negotiations seemingly stalled, the mullahs welcome further delay, not out of altruism for the combatants in Gaza, but because it affords Tehran precious additional time to untangle its strategic dilemma.  

If the cease-fire negotiations do collapse, Iran will have no satisfactory way to escape the unpleasant alternatives it faces.  That is a problem of its own making, having forged its “ring of fire strategy” against Israel over decades, and for reasons still unclear, launching it with Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack.  Tehran may have miscalculated the effect of Hamas’s blitz, which clearly did not crush Israel’s resolve.  Instead, Netanyahu is now close to achieving his stated goal of eliminating Hamas’s political and military capabilities.  

Moreover, with chaos in Gaza so extensive, Israel can now reopen the decades-old issue of what to do next with Gazan civilians, and whether resettlement to third countries is now in order.  Following World War II, tens of millions of refugees who, for whatever reasons, could not return to their home countries were resettled.  Only Palestinian were exempted from this outcome, treated instead as hereditary refugees, weapons against the very existence of Israel.  That already-obsolete plan met its demise thanks to the Iran-Hamas October 7 assault.

Iran could choose to do very little, hoping its reputation as a regional power with nuclear capabilities will not suffer greatly.  Its terrorist surrogates, however, will then question the basic terms of their dependence on Iran.  If the ayatollahs can’t protect terrorist leaders in Tehran, what are their incentive to do Tehran’s bidding in a dangerous and uncertain future?  Might not Tehran’s timidity inspire Iran’s domestic opposition?  Seeing weakness externally, might not the regime’s domestic enemies conclude that their moment to oppose the legitimacy and very existence of the mullahs’ regime is at hand?

The clock is ticking for the ayatollahs.  They do not have forever to decide.

President Ebrahim Raisi’s May 19 death in a helicopter crash has the potential to shatter Iran’s regime and the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself.  Raisi’s obviously unexpected demise was so unnerving and the stakes so high that we cannot yet fully discern the frantic maneuverings and vicious political infighting underway behind the scenes in Tehran.

The critical next step is the regime’s official, definitive statement on the cause of the helicopter crash.  So far, authorities have said only there was no evidence Raisi’s aircraft was attacked (https://apnews.com/article/iran-statement-helicopter-crash-raisi-a19ed365f5f4813c31b3d696acc0a6cb), and the investigation continues. This obviously incomplete explanation is likely intended to buy time and reduce destabilizing speculation, but it cannot be the final word.

Huge political consequences flow from whatever cause is ultimately chosen.  The reality was probably some combination of bad weather, mountainous terrain, pilot error or mechanical malfunction.  Former Foreign Minister Javaid Zarif quickly blamed US sanctions for the lack of spare parts, which is laughable.  Iran has earned hundreds of billions of dollars in international oil sales since Ronald Reagan imposed America’s first sanctions, enough to finance ballistic-missile and nuclear programs and arm countless terrorist groups.  Iran didn’t have enough money to buy new helicopters from its Russian and Chinese friends?

Beyond the obvious non-political causes, Iran could choose to blame the usual foreign suspects (Mossad, CIA) or domestic political, ethnic, or religious opponents.  Assignment of blame could thereby prefigure the leadership struggles already underway, which could explain the delay in saying anything conclusive.  When truth is manipulated, elaborate preparations are often required to destroy conflicting evidence and counterfeit new “evidence.”  Outsiders can only await the final word to assess its impact, if any, on the succession battle.  Meanwhile, in the hours and days after the first reports of the presidential helicopter’s “hard landing,” military and security forces have shored up their defenses against potential unrest or interference from domestic or foreign source (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/world/middleeast/iran-raisi-helicopter-crash.html).

The critical point is the need to select a new Supreme Leader, or at least devise a concrete process for that decision, sooner than anticipated.  Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is approximately 85-years-old and in poor health.  With only two Supreme Leaders since the 1979 revolution, Iran has no established procedure regarding succession.  Many believe the rigged electoral process that brought Raisi to the presidency was intended to establish a more-stable line of succession, with Raisi seamlessly replacing Khamenei at the appropriate time.

Not everyone accepted this ploy, least of all Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who aspires to fill his father’s shoes.  Ironically, the father’s own concerns about establishing a hereditary line of succession, a criticism forcefully made by Mojtaba’s opponents, likely helped propel the notion that the presidency could serve as a stepping stone.  With new presidential elections now set for June 28, it is questionable whether the victor will automatically have the clout to be a top-tier contender to be Supreme Leader.  That means, inevitably, that there could be a plethora of candidates and intense infighting in government circles well ahead of the Supreme Leader’s death, which is likely the only way he will relinquish his office. 

Avoiding uncertainty over the succession is precisely what the regime’s top religious, civil, and military leadership wanted, but it now seems unavoidable.  Widespread politicking, conniving, and worse will widen already-existing splits within Iran’s top leadership and open new ones.  Competing centers of power among the ayatollahs;  leaders in the government’s legislative and judicial branches;  and Revolutionary Guards and regular military commanders already exist or are developing quickly.  The longer the struggle proceeds, the more bitter, more intense, and more protracted it will become.

In terms of raw power, the Revolutionary Guards already constitute a force that can easily resist the weak structures of civil government and even the regular military.  Many characterized the now-deceased Quds Force leader, Qassem Soleimani, as almost a son to Ayatollah Khamenei, with influence far beyond what his official title conveyed.  Given the regime’s unprecedented unpopularity across Iran, because of economic troubles, the discontent of the young people, the outrage caused by Mahsa Amini’s murder eighteen months ago, and longstanding ethnic and religious tensions, the Revolutionary Guards truly are the only reliably loyal shield for the ayatollahs and other regime leaders.

But what if the IRGC fragments?  If Iran’s opposition can drive wedges between Revolutionary Guard leaders, or even within the conventional military, the regime’s near-monopoly of lethal force could be broken.  Disaffected ethnic groups like Kurds and Baluchis could join in as well, raising the prospect of internal clashes, perhaps rising to levels approximating civil war.

Historically, outwardly imposing authoritarian regimes, such as czarist Russia, have often been hollowed out internally long before they fell.  Confronted with determined opponents, they collapsed swiftly.  It is too soon to tell whether the ayatollahs will meet the same fate, but, without doubt, their revolution is now in grave jeopardy.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on May 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Our global adversaries – China, Russia, Iran and its proxies – must be marvelling at their good fortune as President Joe Biden effectively endorses a terrorist veto over Israel’s right to self-defence.
The US President’s unprecedented open threat to withhold arms deliveries to Israel “if they go into Rafah”, and a State Department public report on Israeli conduct of the war, are self-inflicted wounds to a vital alliance. Israel has not yet publicly responded, but it faces critical choices over whether to proceed militarily in Rafah, or back down. Neither option is attractive given the potential consequences.
Biden’s stubbornness is wrong on many levels. First, close allies should always engage privately during wartime. Leaks undoubtedly occur, often intentionally, but preserving even minimal confidentiality is essential to later repairing damage done both at governmental and personal levels.
Piling on publicly in the middle of a war is imprudent, even juvenile, damaging the respect and trust allies must sustain during times of crisis and tension. The propaganda opportunities handed to hostile powers are immeasurable. And if Biden is prepared to cut loose one of America’s most valued partners, what does that foretell for those more-distant, less-favoured than Israel? How does Ukraine feel? Or Taiwan?  
Second, Biden’s motives are not so high-minded as he may have us believe. This is no profile in courage. Domestically, the US President is faring poorly in polls against Donald Trump, and defections to minor-party candidates could sink his re-election chances. In swing-state primaries like Michigan, large numbers of Democrats voted “uncommitted”, posing significant risks if they stay home in November. White House staffers have flagellated themselves to regain key Democratic blocks but they have so far failed. Elizabeth Warren, asserting Israel may be liable for “genocide” in Gaza, exemplifies the problem.
Ironically, while politics dominates Biden’s calculations, his gambit may backfire. Republicans uniformly rejected his approach, as did significant numbers of Democrats. Biden’s threat reflects weakness, coming just weeks after his frantic efforts to pressure Israel not to retaliate strongly after Iran’s missile-and-drone attack.  
The President’s supporters invoke Ronald Reagan’s withholding weapons when Israel struck Palestinians in Lebanon, but the two scenarios are entirely distinct. The US-Israel relation at that time was moral and historical, not strategic, as it is today. Indeed, Reagan later forged the Washington-Jerusalem strategic ties. Biden repeatedly pledged “ironclad support” for Israel after October 7, but subsequently swerved dramatically from that position.
Finally, and most importantly, the substance of Biden’s threat and the thoroughly unsatisfactory State Department report expose the administration as misguided and confused in ways that could haunt future US Presidents.
Close-quarters combat in complex urban environments, let alone in Hamas’s extraordinary network of underground tunnels, is something Western militaries prefer to avoid. Not surprisingly, the State’s report is incoherent and contradictory, doubtless reflecting anti-Israel sentiment in many Department bureaus, and schizophrenia within Biden Administration political ranks. The report lacks specificity, yet incomplete information is hard to assess without adequate context – which is why a fair and accurate reckoning would be most fruitful after the war, not while combat still rages.
The fact that civilians are present in combat areas requires that Israel, or any combatant, determine they are striking only military targets and that civilian casualties are no more than proportional to the importance of such targets. In Rafah, the IDF is seeking to eliminate Hamas’s highest command-and-control hierarchies and its remaining organised military units, all clearly legitimate objectives.
It is unacceptable that Israel may be prevented from achieving its legitimate self-defence goals because the terrorists are so barbaric as to sacrifice their own civilian population to save themselves. If that is what Biden means by saying he objects to Israel entering Rafah, then he is simply endorsing the terrorist veto. Yet it is Hamas that is morally culpable for Gazan civilian deaths, not Israel.  
We do not know what will unfold next, but the decisive choice now lies with Israel’s war cabinet. Biden’s ill-considered threat to cut the Jewish state loose will be at the centre of considerable debate. There is no debate, however, that Biden’s ploy will come back to haunt him, America, and all the West.
John Bolton is a former US National Security Advisor

John Bolton writes for “Independent Arabia” about the outcome of the confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv and issues a very important warning of the next six months

The first batch of overt Iranian attacks on Israeli territory has now concluded, along with the Israeli response, which constituted the first public attack inside Iran. Yet no one should imagine that Tehran’s mullahs have abandoned their grand strategy of hegemony throughout the Middle East and among Muslims, nor that their long-term covert war against Israel will subside and recede. For now, however, the focus should be on Israel’s imminent efforts to eliminate Hamas militarily and politically, and counter the future of Iran’s “Ring of Fire” battle plan.

It remains unclear whether Iran intends Hamas to launch a full “ring of fire” strategy during its barbaric attack on October 7, 2023, and this may remain unknown for some time as well. Whatever Iran’s aims, Israel’s harsh response has crippled Hamas’s conventional combat capabilities. Moreover, Gazans have begun to turn against Hamas, which is crucial for Israel and the Arab world alike. Tehran undoubtedly misjudged Israel’s internal political stability and global aversion to the events of October 7, 2023, but it is likely that Supreme Leader Khamenei believed that Hamas could be left to its fate in any case. Still, he should be concerned about the devastation inflicted on Hamas, even though Iran itself and its other terrorist proxies (the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi and Syrian Shiitemilitias) have suffered little.

For now, Iran seems unwilling to risk losing more of these investments. The mullahs are likely to already recognize the Biden administration’s internal political weakness, as most Americans inevitably do. With the uncertainty that dominates Biden’s re-election, it may be justified and logical for Iranian ayatollahs to worry that any further attacks against Israel, directly or through allied terrorist groups, could trigger a strong U.S. response, at a time when Biden is trying to show support for Israel. The unexpected outcome of the U.S. election campaign, and what a second term for Trump might bring, may indicate a short-term pause on the Iranian side. Waiting for the fall of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government could also be a gift to Iran. No other Israeli leader understands the Iranian threat so clearly, or has Netanyahu’s determination that Israel does not fall prey to what his predecessor Ariel Sharon called a “nuclear holocaust.”

But whatever Iran prefers, it cannot ignore that a decisive Israeli victory against Hamas would irreparably weaken Tehran’s regional position. Israel is certainly not a receiver or merely responding, even if the Biden White House follows this approach. Indeed, Israel may then target Hezbollah’s vast missile stockpile and the quasi-existential threat it poses. If Israel believes that Iran fears enough of direct U.S. intervention, Jerusalem can take decisive action against Hezbollah’s arsenal without fear of major Iranian counterstrikes.

More importantly, the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. elections scheduled for Nov. 5 does not suggest a clear direction for Tehran. Despite Trump’s orders to assassinate Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, Emmanuel Macron almost convinced Trump at the Group of Seven summit in Biarritz to meet with then-Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Thus, even with the Biden administration’s apparent weakness and indecision, Iran’s mullahs can decide to wait for Trump to come again and his limited understanding of America’s core national security interests. Refusing to undertake major new military initiatives before Nov. 5 would avoid exposing the Houthis, Hezbollah, Shiite militias, and even Iran itself to punitive attacks by Jerusalem or Washington.

In this context, too, Iran is taking into account its growing alignment and rapprochement with the fast-growing Sino-Russian axis, a contemporary version of the Sino-Soviet alliance during the Cold War, with Beijing as its largest partner and Moscow as its vassal. Iran sells Russia drones to use against Ukraine. China has increased its oil and gas purchases from Russia. Iran is facilitating Russia’s evasion of international financial sanctions and is considering whether to take a decisive step against Taiwan, possibly before the U.S. election, at a time when Beijing (and Moscow) are still unclear whether to wait until the U.S. election is decided, or to take major steps before that time, with both positive and negative points. The mere fact that this is the subject of heated debate during a fierce US presidential campaign at the partisan level is extremely dangerous and uncertain, a major complicating factor for Russia, China, and Iran.

Meanwhile, public coordination between Iran and other partners in the Beijing-Moscow axis, such as North Korea, has become more apparent. Iran and North Korea have long cooperated closely on nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, but in secret, for reasons that are not hidden. Abandoning any claims about their relations is a sign of increased confidence in these two proliferator rogue states. Unfortunately, America’s adversaries all know that Trump’s desire to make “big deals” with his country’s enemies can easily override any rational calculation of America’s national interests.

The most likely scenario for the next six months would be this: Israeli attacks would leave Hamas a crumbling terrorist network, Jerusalem would increase its campaign against suspected terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza, and tensions along the Lebanese border between Israel and Hezbollah would increase. As the Nov. 5 deadline approaches, and the outcome and the overall picture may become clear, Iran and its proxies will have to make their own decision on whether to take major military action, or wait until a new president is installed. No one thinks the next six months will be quiet.