JRB_MiddleEast/NAfrica

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Trump’s foolish Iran diplomacy

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Saturday’s US-Iran proximity negotiations highlighted the choice between two very divergent futures for Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program.  One path would have Washington re-enter witless negotiations with the ayatollahs, with no evidence they have made a strategic decision to abandon their decades-long quest for weapons of mass destruction.  The alternative is military action against Tehran’s nuclear facilities, or the regime itself, to eliminate any chance of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapons power. By agreeing to further negotiations next week, President Trump’s delegation took at least one step down the first path.  This will prove to be a serious, perhaps deadly, mistake. The Obama and Biden administrations also followed the first path, leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, perhaps the most flawed international agreement in American history.  The deal’s central error was allowing Iran to continue enriching uranium, with an illusory commitment not to advance to weapons-building.  Iran’s conduct since 2015, particularly extensive weaponization activities, is graphic proof that its strategic objective was and remains achieving nuclear-weapons production capabilities. The first Trump presidency withdrew from Obama’s deal in 2018, but failed to take the next critical steps.  Although declaring a campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran, the pressure was obviously inadequate.  Trump himself never embraced the only sure way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, namely overthrowing the ayatollahs or destroying their program by kinetic action.  Even today, we do not know what Trump has the resolve to do. We do know Tehran is reeling, and thus delighted to start endless negotiations to buy time to save its nuclear program.  Israel is decimating Iran’s terrorist proxies. Syria’s Assad regime has fallen.  Last October, Israel crippled Iran’s ballistic-missile manufacturing facilities and destroyed its Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses, and later, after Assad’s fall, the S-300’s in Syria.  Of course the ayatollahs want a break, which is why they have offered an “interim” nuclear agreement(https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement) and asked for sanctions relief during negotiations(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce?mod=hp_lead_pos5), both ploys to create even more delay. Special Envoy Steven Witkoff, leading America’s delegation to Oman, said beforehand that Saturday’s meeting was “about trust building(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/steve-witkoff-interview-iran-nuclear-talks-e41e0114?mod=hp_lead_pos11).”  But there is no trust to be built with the ayatollahs.  They have consistently sought the best of both worlds, committing to abandon their quest for nuclear weapons in exchange for tangible benefits like relief from sanctions, but never actually doing so.  Iran has followed North Korea’s playbook, which has certainly worked well for Pyongyang.  It is nothing less than madness for the US to repeat that mistake. Witkoff says that “our position begins with dismantlement….That is our position today…,” but there might be “other ways to find compromise.”   Earlier, he said “We should create a verification program, so that nobody worries about [Iranian] weaponization….”  These positions are all flatly wrong.  There is, or should be, no compromise on denuclearization.  It is not just Washington’s beginning position, but the middle and ending position as well.  The 2015 deal’s verification terms were utterly inadequate, as Tehran’s continuing progress in weaponization, among other things, proves.  More Iranian progress will come while the talks continue.  The only acceptable verification program would necessarily be so intrusive and transparent it would threaten the very viability of the ayatollahs’ regime.  If Iran isn’t prepared strategically to denuclearize, and to prove it palpably, not just verbally, then destroying the nuclear program or the regime itself are the only alternatives. To be clear, what Witkoff is describing is the Obama-Biden policy.  If that is what he signaled in Oman on Saturday, then Trump has done a U-turn even more dramatic than last week’s about-face on tariffs.  To be clearer still, the result of such a contemporary Obama-Biden-Trump policy will be at least as harmful to America and its Middle East allies as the original model. Israel and the Gulf Arab states have known this for years.  They need no education on the threats Iran poses.  Instead, they are quietly taking military steps to prepare their defenses.  In a little-noticed but potentially significant military exercise(https://www.newsweek.com/arabs-israel-trump-uae-qatar-iran-aircraft-2053399) recently hosted by Greece, Israeli aircraft participated for the first time ever with Qatari and UAE air-force planes.  Carrying potential political perils for all three nations, the foundational, if unspoken, reason for joint exercises was their common adversary, Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu argues correctly that the only acceptable deal is “one modeled after Libya’s, where the U.S. goes in, dismantles the facilities, and destroys the equipment under its own supervision.” Otherwise, “the alternative is military action, and everyone knows it(https://thehill.com/policy/international/5238270-netanyahu-iran-nuclear-facilities/).”  Trump should trust America’s friends, not its enemies. This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on April 14, 2025. Click here to read the original article.
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Ukraine, Trump and the Middle East

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Donald Trump’s jarring Oval Office confrontation with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky symbolizes what is wrong with Trump’s dysfunctional approach to foreign policy.  In what seemed like a television comedy show, Trump accused Zelensky of everything from risking World War III to having no cards to play in defending his homeland from Russia’s unprovoked aggression.  Trump then kicked Zelensky out of the West Wing without even providing lunch. Most American children are raised to be more polite to their guests.  The real meaning of the Oval Office debacle, however, does not turn on who committed the worst breaches of etiquette.  Instead, Trump’s evident hostility toward Zelensky reflected the reversal of America’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian war, from supporting Ukraine to effectively supporting Russia.  Recent US history provides nothing remotely comparable to Trump’s about-face. Trump, of course, contends he is merely seeking peace to stop what he called in his State of the Union address the “senseless” war in Europe’s center.  Of course, neither Russia nor Ukraine consider the war “senseless,” albeit for very different reasons. The Kremlin is fighting to recreate the Russian empire, a goal Putin announced as far back as 2005, whereas Ukraine is defending its freedom and independence.  Americans once fought for freedom and independence, and certainly didn’t consider it “senseless.” What explains Trump’s emphasis on rapidly ending the conflict, and his sympathy for Moscow?  He has frequently said that if he has good personal relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that leader’s country.  Conversely, if his personal relations with a foreign leader are bad, then US relations with his country are bad.  Personal relations have a place in international affairs, as in all things, but they are not decisive factors in national-security decision-making, especially for the world’s hard men like Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, or North Korea’s Kim Jung Un.  These authoritarians are cold-blooded and clear-eyed in knowing what their national interest are, and they pursue those interests unhesitatingly. Trump, by contrast, pursues his personal interest.  He thinks Putin, Xi, and Kim are his friends, even saying(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/we-fell-in-love-trump-and-kim-shower-praise-stroke-egos-on-path-to-nuclear-negotiations/2019/02/24/46875188-3777-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html) he and Kim “fell in love.”  In the case of Ukraine, that explains Trump’s tilt toward Putin and against Zelensky:  Trump wants the war, which he considers Biden’s responsibility, behind him so that Moscow-Washington relations will improve.  During the 2024 campaign,  Trump said repeatedly that the war would never have begun had he been President. Based on my own observations, Putin, reflecting his KGB training and skills, does not think he and Trump are friends.  Rather, Trump is an easy mark, to be manipulated to achieve Moscow’s objectives.  In short, the Kremlin sees Trump as what Vladimir Lenin once called a “useful idiot,” meaning he can be made to serve Russian purposes without realizing what he is doing.  As part of his ongoing manipulation, Putin recently agreed the war in Ukraine would not have occurred under a Trump presidency(https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/24/world/putin-trump-ukraine-crisis-talks-intl/index.html). Putin continued the manipulation by releasing Marc Foley, an American hostage held in Moscow, followed by Belarus releasing another US hostage, and much more.  The game continues, as reflected by Putin’s conditional acceptance of the Saudi-brokered cease-fire between Washington and Kyiv.  Putin doesn’t want to endanger the concessions Trump has already made to him, so he carefully accepted the cease-fire in principle, only to obscure it with conditions and modifications.  Despite this carefully muddled answer, Trump was enthusiastic, saying it was “very good and productive(https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-calls-for-trump-putin-talks-on-ukraine-war-4dd35ede).”  The Kremlin must have celebrated its success. What does Trump himself want?  He wants the Nobel Peace Prize.  After all, Barack Obama won the 2009 Nobel for no particular reason, just months after assuming office.  Under Nobel’s prize rules, nominations for a given year must be submitted by January 31 of that year(https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/nobel-peace-prize/nomination/), meaning Obama’s nominations had to be received eleven days after his Inauguration, making the award laughable.  Trump may not realize it is already too late for him to win this year, but he still craves the faded glory of a Nobel prize. The likely next step on Ukraine is direct Trump-Putin talks, which Trump clearly wants as soon as possible.  Putin also wants direct negotiations because it provides an opportunity to manipulate Trump directly, rather than through intermediaries.  Moreover, by definition, their conversation would exclude Ukraine and the Europeans from the real dealmaking, which won’t bother Trump as all.  While there is no certainty to the outcome of this coming conversation, all signs point to a result heavily skewed in Moscow’s favor. The lesson for the Middle East goes straight to the question, how to deal with Trump?  He is not pursuing some American grand strategy or playing sophisticated three-dimensional chess.  He is pursuing a Trump-centric strategy in two dimensions, one move at a time.  Keep that in mind, pile on some personal flattery of Trump, add pomp and circumstance, and who knows what Trump will be prepared to give away? This article was first published in Independent Arabia on March 17, 2025. Click here to read the original article.
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Trump’s Gaza Dreaming

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Donald Trump’s remarks on the Gaza Strip after his February 4 meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Bibi Netanyahu precipitated enormous controversy and confusion.  They were not idle musings, but written in advance.  Typically, Trump wandered off-script, speculating about using US military force in Gaza, which White House handlers walked back the next day.  Trump himself then promptly walked back the walk-back, insisting he was serious about American control of Gaza, although without force.  (For the record, I have never advocated deploying the US military in Gaza.)

The ensuing furor has obscured the reality that Trump addressed two vastly different issues.  First, and most bizarrely, he asserted that Israel would hand control of Gaza to the US, which would “own” it, and make it “the Riviera of the Middle East.”  Second, and far more important, was Trump’s contention that resettling Gaza’s population in the Strip was the wrong way forward, at least near-term.  This distinction is critical to evaluating Trump’s statements, until changes positions again, perhaps while you read this article.

Trump’s first idea is not going to happen.  It springs from no underlying philosophy, national-security grand strategy, or consistent forward-looking policy.  It derives instead from his first-term pitch to North Korean leader Kim Jung Un that his country’s untouched beaches could become major resort areas.  That did not materialize, but the dream never died.

Wild as it was for North Korea, it is even more so in Gaza.  The aphorism “capital is a coward” is directly applicable.  Because of the ongoing cease-fire/hostage exchange, Hamas is reasserting control in Gaza, suggesting it may not be as debilitated by Israeli military action as initially thought.  In turn, that means Israel will likely resume hostilities, rightly so, when the exchanges end.  Until Gaza is fully secure, capital and labor necessary to build the Middle East’s Riviera, will be few and far between.  “Gaza” itself is an historical accident, reflecting military reality at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, simply a part of the ancient Mediterranean path leading to Egypt.  Standing alone, it is not economically viable as far as the eye can see. 

Trump’s second suggestion about Gaza’s future is not new, having emanated from multiple sources long before his February 4 comments.  If adopted, it would fundamentally, permanently alter the Middle East.  Among other things, it would be the final death knell for the “two-state” solution.  Well before Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack, the two-state solution had become simply an incantation.  Afterwards, in Israel, it all but disappeared as a serious proposition.  Nonetheless, absent any serious effort to create an alternative, the mantra has remained the default position. 

Those days are over.  The fundamental problem with the putative Palestinian “state” was its artificiality, a legacy of radical Arab leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nassar;  its lack of any economic basis;  and its susceptibility to terrorist control.  Nonetheless, if the two-state concept is dead, we must find an alternative.  I once proposed a “three-state” solution:  returning Gaza to Egypt, with Israel and Jordan dividing sovereignty over the West Bank.  This approach would safeguard Israeli security while also settling Palestinians in viable economies, with real futures.  

Palestinians, however, have for decades been so abused by the region’s radical, post-colonial ideologies that neither Cairo nor Amman welcomed having potentially subversive populations come under their jurisdictions.  But the palpable difficulty of resolving the Palestinian issue should not lead regional states and concerned outside powers to fall back to reconstructing high-rise refugee camps in Gaza.  So doing, involving enormous costs in clearing the rubble and unexploded ordnance, not to mention eliminating the Hamas tunnel network, and then reconstruction itself, would inevitably lead to another October 7.  That is obviously unacceptable.

There is an alternative, however, namely changing the way Palestinians have been treated for over seven decades.  UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine relief agency, which is functionally an arm of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, should be abolished, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees transferred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  In turn, UNHCR should follow its basic humanitarian doctrine, under which refugees are either repatriated to their country of origin, or, if that is not possible, resettled in other countries.  There is nothing forcible about UNHCR resettlement, since both refugees and recipient countries must agree.  But it is also true that, unlike UNRWA, UNHCR refugee camps do not last forever.

This is not to the detriment of Palestinians.  Exactly the opposite.  It means they will receive the same humanitarian treatment as every other refugee population since World War II.  As difficult as switching to the UNHCR model may be, Trump’s comments, the first such by a major world leader, may finally ignite the debate that must occur to find a lasting home for the Gaza Palestinians.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on February 10, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

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Ignore Trump’s Gaza distraction. Focus on Iran

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with President Donald Trump, the first post-inaugural White House visit by a foreign leader, could shape the Middle East for generations. Pre-meeting speculation centered on how the leaders would handle the Hamas-Israel war.

Stunningly, Trump’s comments just before and then after his meeting with Netanyahu focused on the U.S. taking control of the Gaza Strip while Gaza’s residents are resettled elsewhere in the Middle East.  There is little point in commenting seriously on this “idea,” which appears to be entirely Trump’s own.

The most important strategic issue in the real Middle East remains Iran’s existential threat to Israel.  Tehran’s ayatollahs can only be delighted if the Trump administration expends any time and effort at all on the Gaza idea rather than addressing their nuclear weapons program. Restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign from Trump’s first term is a sound decision, but still only the beginning of an effective strategy.

Since Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Israel, with U.S. assistance, has dealt Iran and its “ring of fire” strategy major blows. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated but not destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities and its sophisticated, Russian-supplied, S-300 air-defense systems have been all but eliminated. Syria’s Iran-friendly Assad regime has fallen, and its S-300 systems and other military assets have been destroyed. Unfortunately, the Houthis in Yemen, West Bank terrorists, and Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq are only wounded, and not severely.

The job is unfinished, but enormous progress has been made to diminish Iran’s overall threat, especially its terrorist surrogates. The existential danger remains: Its nuclear program is essentially intact, with only one location, the Parchin weaponization facility, attacked. Looking ahead, the central issue remains how to destroy Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts, which threaten not only Israel but also constitute a major proliferation threat to America and the world.

Eliminating this menace is Netanyahu’s real top priority, but it should not be solely Jerusalem’s responsibility. The United States is the only country that can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear). For America and Israel, there has never been a better time to do just that, using carefully targeted force against Iran’s nuclear arms facilities.

Accordingly, Israeli-American objectives should be victory against both Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats. In World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained to his countrymen why this was the only acceptable outcome: “victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

The real debate is between those advocating victory and those advocating the Obama-Biden approach:  endless negotiations on an elusive deal to return Iran’s government to civilized behavior. There are certainly legitimate questions about the timing of striking Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Most important is reducing Iran’s capacity to retaliate against Israel, friendly Gulf Arab states, and deployed U.S. forces in the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah likely retains tens of thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, and Iran itself still has significant numbers of missiles and drones. The clock is running. Tehran is racing to repair the production facilities Israel leveled in October 2024 to replenish its missile stockpiles.

Another mutual priority is achieving Israel’s objective of eliminating the political and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as Netanyahu stressed yesterday. Although Israel has enjoyed remarkable success in Gaza and Lebanon, the recent Gaza hostage releases were staged to portray Hamas as a viable fighting force, with considerable support among Gaza’s civilians. Yet under former President Joe Biden’s ceasefire deal, which Trump’s pre-inaugural pressure on Netanyahu ironically brought to fruition, Israeli negotiations with Hamas over Gaza’s future are due to start. Yet this is precisely what Netanyahu wanted to avoid and why Biden failed for seven months to close the deal. Just because it is now Trump’s deal does not improve it substantively.

Hamas can have no part in any future Gaza, whatever it looks like, nor can Hezbollah have any future in Lebanon. Only by removing these cancers can Gazans and Lebanese have any prospect of normality.  And so long as the ayatollahs rule in Tehran, they will do their best to rearm their terrorist proxies, even under “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Following their summit, Netanyahu and Trump must demonstrate the resolve to persevere, as Churchill said, however long and hard the road may be. Watch what happens on Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on February 5, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

 

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Trump and the Middle East

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History in the Middle East is moving very fast these days.  The long-overdue fall of Syria’s Assad regime is only the latest evidence, and Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration will accelerate the pace.  The central question is whether the principal players seize opportunities now open for lasting regional peace and security before they quickly close.  Of course, there are massive, daunting uncertainties, but leaders should remember the Roman saying, “fortune favors the bold.”

Surprisingly, one of the major uncertainties could be Trump.  In his first term, he was viewed as automatically pro-Israel, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over disputed territory in the Golan Heights.  It would be wrong for several reasons, however, to assume reflexively that this pattern will recur during his second term.

For example, Trump’s private view of Netanyahu is far more negative than generally perceived, exemplified by Trump’s anger when Netanyahu congratulated Biden on winning the 2020 presidential election(https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-jerusalem-israel-middle-east-iran-nuclear-d141ca03a5e38bfb60b37f94a38ecda8).  To most of the world, this was hardly noteworthy, but Trump’s fixation never to be perceived as a loser forced him to argue that the Democrats stole the election, which mythology Netanyahu violated.  Even before that, Trump said in an interview that he thought the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas wanted peace more than Netanyahu(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq1seiWI8ro), which hardly expresses confidence in the Israeli leader.  Moreover, Netanyahu is an expert politician, far more astute than Trump, which undoubtedly also inflames Trump’s vanity.

Moreover, Trump’s obsession to seek a deal on anything and everything, even with Iran’s ayatollahs, may come to dominate his Middle East actions.  As I previously recounted in The Room Where It Happened, Trump came remarkably close to meeting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister, Javid Zarif, at the August, 2019, G-7 summit in Biarritz, France.  French President Emmanuel Macron suggested such an encounter to Trump immediately upon his arrival in Biarritz, and he was initially inclined to agree.  Conferring in Trump’s hotel room with Jared Kushner and White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvanery, I urged against meeting with Zarif.  Trump ultimately did not see Zarif, but, as the Duke of Wellington said of Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo, it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

Trump’s pre-Inauguration intervention in Joe Biden’s long effort to obtain a cease-fire/hostage-release deal between Hamas and Israel is also noteworthy.  After seven months of failure, Trump’s pressure on Israel resulted in Netanyahu finally accepting Biden’s deal, or at least its first phase.  Trump wanted to take credit for the hostage releases, hearkening back to the start of Ronald Reagan’s administration, when Iran returned US embassy officials taken hostage during the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  On that level, Trump succeeded where Biden failed.  But whether Trump understands Biden’s plan has other phases is far from certain, as are the prospects that even the first phase will conclude successfully, let alone those that follow.  

Improbably, however, there have been signs, before and after Trump’s Inauguration, that he may believe that the Gaza war has actually ended.  Steve Witkoff, his family friend and now a special Middle East envoy, has stresses that “phase two” of Biden’s deal, which involves further negotiation between Israel and Hamas, should begin promptly.  This can hardly be what Israel expects.  In addition, Witkoff’s Trumpian “zeal for the deal” mentality, and his inexperience, reflected in naïve public comments(https://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-envoy-says-gaza-ceasefire-could-pave-way-mideast-normalization-deal-inflection-point), are factors that could militate against Israel in the immediate future.  Impressed by Witkoff’s performance to date, Trump may have decided to give him a role in Iran matters, although that remains unclear(https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/trump-witkoff-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal).  Nonetheless, both have said they favored diplomatic options to resolve Iran’s nuclear threat.

If true, this creates a dilemma for Netanyahu.  Right now, Israel and America have the best opportunity ever to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs.  Israel has already massively damaged Iran’s missile-production facilities(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) and at least one target involved in weaponizing highly enriched uranium(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility), not to mention flattening Iran’s sophisticated, Russia-supplied, S-300 air defense systems(https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-s-attack-on-iran-has-left-tehran-offensively-and-defensively-weaker/7848701.html).  Additional attacks in Syria after Assad’s overthrow have opened an air corridor allowing direct access from Israel to Iran.  The path is clear.  

Obstacles remain, notably Iran’s and Hezbollah’s remaining ballistic missiles, which would enable either retaliatory strikes against Israel, or even a pre-emptive strike to foreclose Netanyahu’s options.  Israel, Jordan, and nearby Arab states must also worry about the current regime in Damascus, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”) terrorist group.  Having shed his nom de guerre, and changed from combat fatigues to suits and ties, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing his best to convince outsiders that he now simply seeks responsible government in Syria.  Whether this is true remains unclear, as do Turkish aspirations in Syria and across the region.  The Biden administration(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/) reportedly went so far as to share intelligence with HTS about ISIS, although whether Trump will continue this risky business is unknown.

What is inescapable is that while Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities have never been more vulnerable, Trump’s new administration seemed undecided on its future course.  His first term may not be an accurate prediction of his second.  There is no Trumpian grand strategy at work here since he does not do grand strategy.  Instead, he is transactional, episodic, and ad hoc, often making decisions based on whatever the last person he consults with recommends.  This may be the real future of America’s policy in the Middle East.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on January 28, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

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Negotiating Advice for Ukraine Supporters

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During the 2024 campaign, candidate Donald Trump said he could resolve the Ukraine war in twenty-four hours by getting together with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky to thrash things out.  At a January 7 press conference, President-elect Trump conceded it could take up to six months.  Call that learning.  

Trump fundamentally wants the war to disappear.  He has said repeatedly it would never have occurred had he been President, as he has also said about the ongoing Middle East conflict.  Of course, these statements are, by definition, neither provable nor disprovable, but they reflect his visceral feeling that the wars are Biden’s problem and should disappear when Biden does.

Neither war will disappear so quickly, but Trump’s comments strongly suggest that he is indifferent to the terms on which they end.  That is likely bad news for Ukraine, though it could be good news for Israel in its struggle against Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy.  As Inauguration Day nears, there is precious little information publicly available about what Trump will actually do.  And, because he has neither a coherent philosophy nor a strategic approach to foreign affairs, what he says in the morning may not apply in the afternoon.

Accordingly, those concerned for Ukrainian and Western security should focus clearly on what is negotiable with Moscow and what is not.  Early decisions on the central components of potential diplomacy can have far-reaching implications that the parties will inevitably try to turn to their benefit.  Ukraine especially must make several key decisions about how to proceed.  Consider the following.

Although a cease-fire linked to commencing negotiations may be inevitable because of pressure from Trump, such a cease-fire is not necessarily in Ukraine’s interest.  Talking while fighting was a successful strategy for the Chinese Communist Party in its struggle against the Kuomintang during and after World War II.  It could work for Ukraine today under certain conditions.  Most important, of course, is the continued supply of adequate military assistance, which is questionable with Trump in office.

But a cease fire can be more perilous for Ukraine than for Russia:  the longer negotiations take, the more likely it is the cease-fire lines become permanent, a new border between Ukraine and Russia far into the future.  As negotiations proceed, the absence of hostilities will provide opportunities for Moscow to seek full or at least partial easing of economic sanctions, which many Europeans seem poised to concede.  Moreover, once hostilities stop, they are far harder politically to resume, which is also likely to Ukraine’s disadvantage.  Although Russia would probably win an indefinite war of attrition, it also needs time to rebuild its debilitated military and economy.  A cease fire affords that opportunity, and thereby buys time for Russia to heal its wounds and prepare the next attack.  Russia waited eight years after its 2014 offensive, and can afford to wait again until the West is distracted elsewhere.  

If Trump insists on a cease-fire-in-place and contemporaneous negotiations, Ukraine must be careful to avoid having the talks aim at a permanent solution rather than a temporary accommodation.  Russia will see any deal as temporary in any case, no matter what it says publicly.  Vladimir Putin obsesses over reincorporating Ukraine into a new Russian empire, and each slice of territory Russia takes back brings that goal closer.  Negotiating an “end” to the war plays into the Kremlin’s hands, since it provides the false impression to gullible Westerners that there is no risk of future aggression.

Both the cease-fire issue and the duration of any deal raise two other questions:  should there be “peacekeepers” along the cease-fire line, and should Ukraine insist on “security guarantees” from the West (NATO or otherwise) against future Russian aggression?

Peacekeeping is operationally complex, and rarely successful in any sense other than helping prolong a military stalemate.  That is nearly the uniform outcome of UN peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping forces (like UNIFIL in Lebanon or UNDOF on the Golan Heights) simply become part of the landscape, in peace or war.  The Security Council loses interest in resolving the sources of the underlying conflict.  The peacekeepers become irrelevant, as recent developments along the cease-fire line between Israel and Syria demonstrate.  In short, peacekeepers are essentially only hollow symbols.  

Indeed, it is the recognition of UN ineffectiveness that has likely inspired calls for deploying NATO peacekeepers along the Ukraine-Russia line-of-control.  But does anyone expect Russia to agree meekly?  Will Moscow not suggest peacekeepers from Iran or North Korea along with NATO?  Moreover, there has been little discussion about what a peacekeeping force’s rules of engagement would be, whether deployed by the UN or NATO.  Would these rules be typical of UN operation, where the peacekeepers can only use force only in self-defense?  Or would the rules be more robust, allowing force in aid of their mission?  Really?  In aid of their mission, NATO peacekeepers would be allowed to use force against Russian troops?  Or Ukrainian troops?  In such circumstances, potential troop-contributing countries would make themselves very scarce.

Future security guarantees for Ukraine, which it is insisting upon, are unfortunately likely to be blue smoke and mirrors.  Russia has repeatedly said that NATO membership  —  the only security guarantee that really matters  —  is a deal-breaker.  European Union security guarantees?  Good luck with that.  Security guarantees by individual nations?  That was the approach of the Budapest agreements on returning Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia;  they didn’t work out so well.  In short, “security guarantees” are mellifluous words, but evanescent without US and NATO participation, which Trump seems unlikely to endorse.

Negotiations are looming primarily because Trump wants the war to go away.  Europe is too tired and too incapable of charting a different course.  Contemplating these depressing scenarios, therefore, Ukraine and its supporters may have little choice but to acquiesce in talks on unfavorable terms.  For that very reason, Kyiv should be very cautious on what it agrees with Trump.

This article was first published in 19fortyfive on January 12, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

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Trump and Iran

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Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change.  The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough.  Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day?  The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel.  Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress.  Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon:  its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered.  Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power.  Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq.  Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities.  Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal.  Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable.  Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn.  These boasts remain unfulfilled.  The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat.  If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition.  Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term.  If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax.  Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort.  Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense.  Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with.  Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).”  In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously.  And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20.  In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics.  This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine.  Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces.  If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran.  Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally.  Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels.  The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”:  he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric.  Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve.  An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime.  Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance.  If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list.  China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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What Next in the Middle East?

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One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly.  Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history.  It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage.  We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing.  Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power.  Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel —  and potentially the Gulf Arab states  —  with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack.  Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran.  Yahyah Sinwar remains at large;  Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages;  and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed.  Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond.  As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues.  Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers.  That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated  inventory of up to 150,000 missiles.  Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas.  What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight.  As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability.  Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran.  Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated.  Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled.  Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm.  The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank.  Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters.  It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp.  The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq.  Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7.  That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage.  This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs.  A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent.  In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression.  Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles.  Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed.  Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority.  In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune.  If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future.  In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government.  It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Lasting Middle East peace requires regime change in Iran

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October 7, 2023, is truly “a day which will live in infamy,” to borrow Franklin Roosevelt’s memorable description of Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. 

But what Hamas did to innocent Israeli civilians on October 7 and thereafter is the more infamous for its outright barbarity, savagery committed with malice aforethought, the very definition of terrorism.

Stunningly, however, and sadly, many Westerners, one year later, still fail to grasp the full implications of the Iran-Hamas attempted holocaust. 

October 7 initiated Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel, “the little Satan”. The immediate response from Iran’s Western media and think-tank apologists was to deny Iran’s central role. 

They pointed to US intelligence that elements of Iran’s leadership were unaware Hamas was about to blitz Israel. They argued there was no “smoking gun” evidence of Tehran’s command-and-control over the Hamas terrorists. But even if these assertions are true, they do not refute the logic and reality of Tehran’s responsibility. 

Why should anyone expect that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which takes orders directly from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would tell anyone who didn’t have an urgent “need to know” what was to happen? The Quds Force and its ilk are not exactly communicative; they are not like US or other Western bureaucracies. Among those quite likely kept in the dark would be Iran’s foreign ministry and even higher authorities. 

Iran’s October 1, 2024, barrage of 180-plus ballistic missiles against Israel corroborates the point that civilian Iranian officials are not in the decision-making loop. The New York Times’s Thomas Friedman reported that day, citing Israeli sources: “The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was not informed of the attack until shortly before it began, the sources said, indicating that the Iranian regime is divided over the operation, which will probably add to the fractures in the government.” If the President himself was blindsided by the enormously significant second missile attack on Israel, it is no stretch to conclude many were iced out before October 7. 

Nor is the failure of Israeli and other intelligence agencies to uncover an Iran-to-Hamas “execute order” surprising. No Western intelligence agency detected the impending Hamas attack, a massive failure all around. Missing the “execute order” is simply one piece of a more profound intelligence debacle. 

This history is critical. It helps explain, although certainly does not justify, the larger Biden administration failure, shared by all European governments, to react strategically against the real threat: Iran. 

The past year has not been a Palestinian war against Israel, nor an Arab war against Israel. It has been an Iranian war against Israel, fought directly by Tehran’s own military and through its numerous terrorist proxies, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraqi and Syrian Shia militia groups. And behind the terrorist storm troopers lies Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, seeking to produce the world’s most dangerous weapons. This is the ring of fire now directed against Israel, but readily convertible to a ring of fire around the Arabian Peninsula’s oil-producing monarchies. 

The Arab governments at risk are acutely aware of the dangers they face from Tehran. They understand that their strategic assessment is essentially identical to Israel’s, explaining the basis for the Abraham Accords to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. 

Further progress on more Abraham Accords is now on hold for the duration of the conflict, but many believe the possibility of broader recognition of Israel in the Islamic world was what motivated Iran to implement the “Ring of Fire” in the first place. 

One year into the conflict, Israel is doing well. Hamas is nearing complete elimination of its top leadership and organised military capabilities. Hezbollah is well on the way to the same fate. The Houthis, for inexplicable reasons, are still largely untouched, despite their broader threat to the basic principles of freedom of the seas that Britain and America have sought to defend for centuries. 

The blame for failing to destroy the Houthi military capabilities can be laid on US and UK incompetence rather than on Israel. The same applies to Washington’s failure to decimate Shia militias in Iraq and Syria that have repeatedly attacked American civilian and military personnel since October 7. 

Israel’s schwerpunkt, however, has been and undoubtedly remains Iran itself. After this April’s missile-and-drone attack, the Biden administration forced Israel to “take the win” and respond with only one pin-prick strike. That piece of brilliance has obviously failed. Now, Israel is deciding whether to retaliate against Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, oil infrastructure, top leadership, military facilities, or a creative mix-and-match combination. We will know shortly what Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Cabinet decide. 

Israel’s next move is on behalf of everyone in the world who rejects terrorism from Iran, or any other source. We can only wish Jerusalem the best, hoping it encourages the people of Iran to take their fate into their hands, beginning the overthrow of Tehran’s mullahs. 

Whatever Israel does now, the only durable outcome for Iran is ousting the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on October 6, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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Israel has exposed the lie at the heart of Starmer and Biden’s foreign policy

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Jerusalem’s bold strike at the heart of terror should bring shame to Western states still in thrall to false peace

Hassan Nasrullah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, died on Friday, courtesy of an Israeli air strike. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy, unfolding militarily against Israel across the Middle East since last October 7, has suffered a major setback.  

Jerusalem has already nearly destroyed Hamas’s organised military capabilities in Gaza and, combined with “Operation Grim Beeper” just over a week ago, has repeatedly imposed shock and awe on Hezbollah’s top cadres and infrastructure.  

Since Nasrullah met his maker, Israeli forces have pounded Hezbollah strongholds by air and are readying a ground attack, likely aiming to clear out all terrorist threats south of Lebanon’s Litani River.

Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu flatly ignored President Joe Biden’s pressure not to escalate military action against Hezbollah, and also Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s speech to the United Nations.  

The BBC derided Israel’s efforts, headlining that Netanyahu was trying to “chase victory”  Israel, however, clearly signalled its resolve against Iran, a quality much lacking in recent US and UK policy. Hezbollah and, more importantly, its paymasters in Tehran, should recognize that Israel is determined to do what it takes to establish its security, notwithstanding enormous external pressure.

Also on Friday, Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked US Navy vessels in the Red Sea, the latest example of Iran’s year-long campaign via its Houthi proxies to close the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage to all but friendly vessels. The Houthis openly declared they would support Hezbollah “without limits”. Showing solidarity with its mates, the Houthis again launched missiles against Israel itself.  

These terrorist groups, like their allies Hamas and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, have been armed, equipped, trained and financed by Iran for decades, as part of Tehran’s Ring of Fire strategy. Tehran is now arranging for Moscow to arm the Houthis with anti-ship missiles, evidence of Iran’s growing Russian ties.

Both the White House and 10 Downing Street need to lift their eyes to the strategic level. The barbaric Hamas October 7 attacks constituted but one facet of Iran’s multifront threat against Israel.  

Britain and America once understood what it meant to fight a multi-front war. They did so together successfully in two World Wars, and then again during the Cold War.  

Today, Messrs Biden and Starmer have trouble with this concept. Fortunately, Israel’s leaders do not. For the good of the West as a whole, Israel is now decimating our terrorist enemies in the Middle East.

Although Jerusalem still receives military aid from Washington, London has turned icy, and Biden’s White House is growing more frigid. Neither America’s Secretary of State nor its UN Ambassador attended Netanyahu’s General Assembly speech. And that was before Israel’s strike at Nasrullah.

Despite pro-terrorist propaganda, and the media echo chamber of supporters, the current conflict was never a war of Palestinians against Israeli oppressors. From the start, it has been an Iranian war against Israel.

Failure to grasp this bigger picture, a failure common to the national-security departments and agencies in Washington and London since October 7, persists in their opposition to Jerusalem’s determination to at the very least neutralise the serious terrorist threats it faces.  

Certainly, Israel has made its share of mistakes over the past year, along with the West generally, and can be faulted for allowing the terrorist menace to grow to its present levels.

We have all repeatedly dealt fecklessly with Iran’s efforts to create nuclear weapons. But now that the reality of present danger has become crystal clear, quibbling about Israel’s determination to survive is quite unbecoming to the West’s leaders.

Failed and misbegotten diplomacy toward Iran and Hezbollah particularly has helped produce the current conflict. I know personally because of my service as US Ambassador to the UN during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.

Although the inadequacies of Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought that conflict to a halt, were evident even as the Council was voting unanimously to approve it, recent years have shown it to be wholly ineffective. Resolution 1701’s central objective was to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah after Israel’s devastating retaliation for combined Hamas-Hezbollah attacks from Gaza and Lebanon (sound familiar?).  

To say the least, this UN diplomacy facilitated exactly the opposite result. It did not strengthen an independent Lebanese government, with the backing of enhanced UN peacekeeping forces, to stand against Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah in effect took over the Lebanese government.  

As with Hamas in Gaza, not until Hezbollah is eliminated will the truly innocent civilians have a chance for representative government.

Today’s real issue is Iran. Far from being eager to aid now-beleaguered Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is clearly worried it will face direct, devastating retaliation from Israel. Indeed, there were reports even before Israel’s elimination of Nasrullah that Iran was dodging Hezbollah entreaties for Iran to come to its defence.

Iran has been visibly nervous about responding to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyah on July 31, and Nasrullah’s exit will only make the ayatollahs more nervous.

The fear that this time Netanyahu will not succumb to American pressure to “take the win,” as Israel did in April after Iran’s unsuccessful missile and drone attack, is clearly chilling Iran’s leadership. As well it should.

While the future is decidedly murky, Israelis undoubtedly remain determined to defend themselves. Too bad the current United Kingdom and the United States governments are not proud to stand with them.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on September 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

ABOUT JOHN BOLTON

Ambassador John Bolton, a diplomat and a lawyer, has spent many years in public service. He served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005-2006. He was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. In the Reagan Administration, he was an Assistant Attorney General.

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