What is required of Sharia to obtain full American recognition

Posted on May 26, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Donald Trump’s just-concluded Middle East visit produced considerable press coverage for the business deals and investments he and his counterparts announced. The visit’s biggest news, however, was his declaration that the United States would lift economic sanctions on Syria imposed during the Assad regime. Trump said in Riyadh(https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-starts-gulf-visit-seeking-big-economic-deals-2025-05-13/), “Oh what I do for the crown prince [Mohammed bin Salman].”

Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, even received a brief meeting with Trump in Riyadh(https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/14/middleeast/syria-trump-meeting-analysis-intl). In 2013, America had named(https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209499.htm) Al-Sharaa, under his nom de guerre Mohammed al-Jawlani, a “specially designated global terrorist,” and put a $10 million bounty on his head. The US had previously listed his terrorist group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, once known as the Al Nusrah Front, an Al Qaeda affiliate, as a foreign terrorist organization.

American presidents don’t normally meet with terrorists, but al-Sharaa obviously received good public-relations advice after taking power: he abandoned his nom de guerre, trimmed his beard, and traded his combat fatigues for a suit and tie, looking more like a businessman than a terrorist. But have Al Sharaa and HTS truly renounced terrorism?

Trump didn’t wait to find out. To be sure, Trump advised al-Sharaa during their meeting to sign an Abraham Accord recognizing Israel, expel foreign terrorist fighters from Syria, and join the fight against ISIS. But Al-Sharaa made no apparent commitment to do so, certainly not publicly. This is hardly “the art of the deal” at its finest.

Saudi Arabia’s interests, and those of the broader Arab world, in accepting al-Sharaa’s new government are clear. Assad’s fall was a massive defeat for Iran, losing its most important regional ally and cutting off land supply routes to Hezbollah, Iran’s principal terrorist proxy. Moving to restrict Turkish President Erdogan’s influence in Syria was also important, since HTS could not have overthrown Assad without Ankara’s considerable assistance.

Defeating Tehran’s mullahs and restraining Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman influence in Syria and the Middle East generally are also in America’s interest. But these objectives are not enough. Washington needs more than rhetoric from al-Sharaa, it needs performance of concrete actions proving he has abandoned terrorism in fact not just in talk. Trump let the moment slip when he should have insisted on America’s conditions to lift sanctions, but the designations of al-Sharaa and HTS as terrorists, and Syria’s Assad-era designation as a state sponsor of terrorism remain in effect. These listings should not be rescinded unless and until al-Sharaa’s regime meets several further conditions, enumerated below. Moreover, if it fails to do so promptly, sanctions should be reimposed.

Most importantly, al-Sharaa must permanently reverse Assad policies that led to Syria’s ostracization, and be completely transparent with the Assad’s government’s archives and related materials. Since non-terrorist governments do not take hostages, al-Sharaa should open Syria’s government records to international review on all aspects of foreign hostages seized over the past decades. For the hostage families’ sake, their stories must be told fully, and any Syrian links with foreign entities assisting the hostage-taking must be disclosed to law-enforcement agencies for appropriate follow-up.

There must also be a clean break from all Assad regime efforts in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, particularly ties with governments like Iran. After Assad’s fall, Israel reportedly bombed suspected chemical-weapons facilities, but al-Sharaa should nonetheless identify all chemical-weapons-related sites in Syria, and open these locations and government files to inspection either by Washington or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Comparable steps need to be taken regarding biological weapons.

Syria’s nuclear activities likely centered on the nuclear reactor, which it aided Iran and North Korea in building at Deir al-Zour. Syrian records on Deir al-Zour and other links with Iran could prove invaluable in countering Tehran’s regional threat. Syria should take every step to preserve this evidence and make it available for international review. Al-Sharaa should also abandon support for Iran’s efforts to dominate Lebanon through Hezbollah.

Moreover, if al-Sharaa has indeed renounced terrorism, he needs to fully disclose Al Nusrah’s funders over the years. He should commit to working with the Kurds, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces, in securely confining their thousands of ISIS prisoners. Other terrorists in Syria should be imprisoned there, not expelled, as Trump suggested, possibly to return to terrorism elsewhere. Signs of possible Turkish reconciliation with its own Kurdish citizens do not prove that Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions regarding Kurdish-populated areas in Syria and elsewhere have diminished. Accordingly, US forces need to remain in northeastern Syria until HTS’s good faith is fully proven.

Finally, Syria should expel Russia from its naval station at Tartus and air base at nearby Hmeimim. Russia’s 2022 unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, not to mention its long-time support for Assad, prove how dangerous an extensive Russian military presence in Syria is

In short, Al-Sharaa has a long way to go before he and his HTS regime deserve full recognition and legitimacy from the United States. This “deal” is not yet done.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabia on May 19, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Starmer’s turn against Israel will prolong war

Posted on May 26, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Removing the ayatollahs in Iran is the only route to securing longterm peace in Gaza

Israel is now grappling with possibly the last phases of eliminating the Hamas terrorist threat. Instead of support from a unified West determined to extirpate terrorism, however, Jerusalem is under attack for attempting exactly that. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said he was “horrified” by Israel’s recent “escalation”. Foreign Secretary David Lammy condemned the “dark new phase in this conflict,” suspended trade negotiations with Israel, and said it should agree to a cease-fire to free remaining hostages, as if that were Jerusalem’s only legitimate objective.

Last week, a gunman in Washington brutally murdered two Israeli embassy employees, chanting “free, free Palestine” while being arrested. Thereafter, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Starmer and others were “on the wrong side” of justice, humanity and history. Starmer has not responded. Before he does, he should at least check the history.

Immediately after Hamas’s barbaric October 7, 2023, invasion, Netanyahu declared that Israel would seek Hamas’s political and military destruction. This was an entirely legitimate exercise of UN Charter Article 51, which affirms “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”

Jerusalem was not limited to a “proportional” response, something comparable to the Hamas terrorist attack, any more than America was limited to a “proportional” response to Pearl Harbor. States are entitled not merely to repel threats, but to destroy them, as the allies did to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Moreover, clear from the outset and becoming clearer by the day as new information emerges, Hamas’s attack was part of Iran’s “ring of fire strategy” against Israel, a strategy implemented by the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Just to remind, “Quds” is an Arabic term for Jerusalem, celebrated on Ramadan’s last day by Palestinians as “Quds Day.” Implementing its “ring” strategy, Tehran created or fostered a chain of terrorist groups: Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia militias in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria was a key ally.

The anti-Israel strategy unfolded across the Middle East immediately after October 7. From the beginning, Israel saw Gaza as part of a wider war, not merely a discrete conflict. Now far more evident than at the outset, however, is the war’s economic dimension, a critical factor long before October 7.

Iran and other regional states, groups and individuals provided billions of dollars, directly and through international agencies like UNRWA, ostensibly for humanitarian aid. Tragically, however, as we now know, Hamas diverted much of these “humanitarian” resources to build Gaza’s underground fortress of tunnel networks; armed itself to the hilt (including with missile arsenals capable of menacing all Israel); and effectively mobilised most Gazans to serve as human shields for that fortress. If Hamas kept adequate records that can be recovered, the story will embarrass those who enabled this massive fraud, particularly in the West.

Meanwhile, Jerusalem is pursuing its post-October 7 goals, which must include eliminating all potential assets, in cash or in kind, Hamas can use to retain control over Gaza’s population. Working through UNRWA over decades, Hamas seized control over the distribution of virtually all humanitarian supplies entering Gaza. Credible reports (and Hamas records, if recovered) demonstrate how the terrorists rewarded their cadres at the expense of others, using control over the internal distribution of supplies in Gaza to cement their political control.

This pattern is nothing new. After the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used the UN’s “Oil for Food” programme to gain control over Iraq’s population. As originally conceived, an intrusive UN presence would use Iraq’s oil revenues for humanitarian aid to its people, thus ensuring the non-political delivery of assistance to the truly needy, while also demonstrating to Iraqis that Saddam had effectively lost control of his country. He repeatedly rejected this model, until the Clinton administration conceded that his regime would disburse Oil-for-Food aid. That mistake helped Saddam reinforce his authoritarian grip, repress Kurds and other dissidents, and again threaten his neighbours,

Hamas has thus simply been following Saddam’s plan. Israel, by contrast, has followed principles Herbert Hoover first articulated in World War I when he organised relief programs in Europe, starting in Belgium. Hoover ordered that no aid would go to combatants, and that his volunteers would distribute the aid, or at least rigorously monitor delivery to prevent diversion to combatants.

Hamas scorned Hoover’s principles, and continues to do so. Comments by Starmer, Lammy and others ignore both the reality in Gaza today and Hoover’s wise admonitions about ensuring that relief goes to those who actually need it, not those who use the aid to oppress them.

Israel has a plan to aid Gazans, backed by Washington but opposed by the UN. Instead of criticising Israel, Starmer should support and help perfect Jerusalem’s plan and thereby properly deliver humanitarian assistance.

The only way Gazans can ever be free is to eliminate the curse of Hamas. And because Gaza is part of Iran’s larger war against Israel and the West, that will happen only when Iranians are free of the ayatollahs. That should be our common goal.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on May 26, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Will Trump Blow Up the National Security Council?

Posted on May 19, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

President Trump is reportedly considering(https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/rubio-working-major-changes-national-security-council-rcna206658) major alterations to the National Security Advisor’s role and the National Security Council staff. One administration source said(https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/14/politics/rubio-national-security-council-overhaul) the “NSC as we know it is done.” The potential changes center apparently on reducing the staff and its responsibility for developing and coordinating policy formulation, particularly long-range policy, and making it an implementer of Mr. Trump’s directives.

If executed, such changes will affect not merely the staff, but the NSC process itself. Ignoring history’s lessons, reflecting instead Mr. Trump’s aversion to coherent strategy and policy, the proposals would seriously harm both the administration’s already haphazard decision-making process and the president’s ability to manage the enormous foreign-policy, defense, intelligence, and homeland-security bureaucracies. The ultimately critical factor in presidential national-security strategy is judgment, but a properly functioning NSC staff can help provide the necessary information and options foundational to the sound exercise of judgment.

The 1947 National Security Act established the NSC to help presidents get their arms around the new and enlarged departments and agencies required to cope with a complex, menacing international environment, the likes of which we had never before experienced. Because presidents differ in their work habits, the NSC structure was intended to be flexible, varying in size and shape over time. But through often painful lessons in recent decades, until Trump 47, a broad consensus formed over an optimal approach.

Dwight Eisenhower was the first president to pay real attention to NSC staffing, which he structured along lines comparable to his military experience. John Kennedy rebelled against what he saw as excessive rigidity, at least until the Bay of Pigs, the discouraging and intimidating 1961 Vienna summit with Nikita Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis convinced him that structure wasn’t so bad after all.

The personalized National Security Advisor roles of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brezinski in the Nixon/Ford and Carter administration respectively have received enormous attention, but, in between, Brent Scowcroft was building the current NSC model. Scowcroft would perfect the model under George H.W. Bush, confronting Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the start of the post-Cold War era.

Scowcroft devised a system to coordinate and control the flow of decision-making, topped by Cabinet-level NSC meetings chaired by the President; “principals” meetings, also cabinet-level, led by National Security Advisors; “deputies” meetings attended by deputy- and undersecretary-level officials; down to meetings of assistant and even deputy assistant secretaries. Some describe this five-tiered edifice as too bureaucratic, but Bush 41 and others proved it could move as fast and comprehensively as exigent circumstances warranted.

The plan embodied the principal of subsidiarity, with decisions made at the lowest level achievable, with only the most important issues occupying the attention of the president and his top advisors. This system’s substantive outcome was providing the ultimate decision makers with all the pertinent data, the full range of available options, the pros and cons of each, and forward thinking about implementation, counter-moves by adversaries and allies, and possible US responses.

To Scowcroft also goes considerable credit for repairing the NSC after the Iran-Contra crisis, its worst mistake, during which NSC staff became operational. Since then, almost all agree the NSC should coordinate, and implementing departments and agencies should implement. Not all have adhered perfectly to this maxim.

Importantly, the size of the NSC staff is solely a dependent variable. Size follows mission. Setting a staff level before deciding its tasks is backwards. Moreover, comparing current staff levels to prior administrations is inapposite for several reasons. In bygone days, only “professionals,” not “administrative” staff, were counted; Situation Room staffers were sometimes included in NSC numbers, sometimes not; and, pre-9/11, there were almost no “homeland security” staff anywhere in the White House.

On the president personally, Scowcroft ‘s model bestowed one key advantage: creating interagency staff contacts reaching into deep bureaucratic depths gave far greater insight into potential agency agendas and disagreements before they rose to higher levels, thereby reducing the risks of bureaucratic obfuscation and delay. Similarly, presidents today have significantly enhanced capabilities to monitor how their decisions are implemented down below in the operating agencies. A dramatically constrained NSC staff would simply not have such abilities.

Everyone knows presidents make the ultimate decisions. But will they make the best-informed decisions, in widely varying contexts, or will they merely follow their own neuron flashes? The animus now directed at Scowcroft’s system largely emanates from fear of the bureaucracy (“deep state”’ to Trump acolytes). The real question is whether top decision-makers will run the bureaucracy or whether the bureaucracy runs them. If the highest levels fail to drive lower levels, the fault lies more with inadequate top officials who lack knowledge, experience, and resolve.

The NSC system has its faults, but turning its staff into liege-men and -women will not benefit America, or even Donald Trump.

This article was first published in Wall Street Journal on May 19, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

What Next After Rome?

Posted on April 22, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

No one was more surprised than Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu when he learned of Donald Trump’s intention to reopen negotiations with Iran over its nuclear-weapons program. At an April 7 meeting in Washington, Netanyahu almost certainly expected to move forward on plans for a potential Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, perhaps together with the United States. There were, of course, other issues on the agenda, particularly Trump’s tariff war with friends and foes alike, but Iran’s existential nuclear threat to Israel was the most pressing.

Trump rebuffed Netanyahu (https://apnews.com/article/trump-netanyahu-tariffs-iran-gaza-9aaf17d50beb5a5891895a702a1bac5d) according to multiple press accounts. Neither the first nor the second negotiations, on April 12 and 19, produced any visible progress, although the sides agreed to reconvene on April 26, preceded by “technical-level” talks. Trump would do well to remember one of baseball’s most important rules: three strikes and you’re out.

Iran’s unrelenting efforts to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons, and the extraordinary threat posed thereby, make the logic of preventative destruction of its capabilities unarguable to Netanyahu and many others, Israeli and American alike. With good reason, therefore, Israel believed that Trump would agree that destroying Iran’s nuclear program was entirely justifiable.

No one could say Israel was acting hastily or rashly. For three decades, Iran has pursued deliverable nuclear weapons, and the threat has grown with time. Nothing has changed the mullahs’ strategic decision to achieve that goal, not diplomacy, not economic sanctions, and not mere threats of using force. Iran’s progress on both the nuclear and missile fronts has been clear and dangerous, and the need to decide whether to use military force, already long overdue, is increasingly apparent.

What the outside world knows about Iran’s capabilities, frightening though it is, must also be weighed against what we do not know because of inadequate intelligence and international oversight. Tehran has consistently obstructed the International Atomic Energy Agency, barring its inspectors from key military facilities undertaking the critical weaponization work on nuclear arms. Moreover, Iran could be even closer to achieving nuclear weapons than suspected because of its cooperation with North Korea. exemplified by the North’s construction of Iran’s Dair Alzour reactor in Syria, destroyed by Israel in 2007. Pakistani nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan supplied both Tehran and Pyongyang their initial uranium-enrichment and weapons-design plans. Thus, what we detect in Iran could be merely a part of its nuclear program, with subcontracted facilities buried undetected in North Korea.

Accordingly, for Israel, the key question is not if it should strike Iran’s nuclear program, but when, and whether it would strike alone or with the United States. Viewed strategically, Washington has every justification to take military action against Tehran’s proliferation efforts. Iran’s nuclear threat is not a problem merely for Israel, but for the entire world. For thirty years, the ayatollahs have sought to become a nuclear power, to the detriment of everyone else. America has the wherewithal to eliminate this proliferation threat, and would be politically and morally justified in doing so. Helping Israel de-fang Iran follows quite logically.

Trump may not have the resolve or character required to make this difficult decision. Reports indicate deep splits(https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/us/politics/trump-israel-iran-nuclear.html?searchResultPosition=1) within his administration over using force against Iran, with several of its least competent senior officials arguing against doing so. Fortunately, however, while a combined US-Israeli strike would be more likely to achieve total success, Washington’s participation is not a necessity. Israel’s own forces can destroy or at least substantially cripple Iran’s program far into the future, albeit with some subsequent maintenance work from time to time. Moreover, if Israel is prepared to act, it should not seek merely a partial destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but its entirety. There may not be a better time than now.

What the ayatollahs will really fear after Israeli strikes, with or without US participation, is the reaction of Iran’s people. Tehran’s ayatollahs have lost enormous power in the Middle East and are urgently trying to rebuild their network of terrorist proxies even while trying to shore up the regime domestically. Assad’s fall in Syria, added to the defeats Israel has inflicted on Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis since October 7, has produced significant finger-pointing and recrimination inside Iran(https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-syria-assad.html).

The very foundations of the 1979 revolution are now severely weakened. Losing the nuclear program could be the spark that ignites Iran’s people, at long last, to rise against the regime and fragment its top leadership. The ayatollahs desperately need relief from Israel’s punishing military assaults and from international economic sanctions. Entering lengthy negotiations with Washington would give them a lifeline.

For those who oppose the world’s most dangerous nations possessing the world’s most destructive weapons, this is not a time, as Lady Thatcher once advised, to go wobbly. End the fruitless discussions with Tehran, and do what is necessary to safeguard the world from a nuclear Iran.

This article was first published in the Independent Arabia on April 22, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump’s foolish Iran diplomacy

Posted on April 14, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Saturday’s US-Iran proximity negotiations highlighted the choice between two very divergent futures for Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program. One path would have Washington re-enter witless negotiations with the ayatollahs, with no evidence they have made a strategic decision to abandon their decades-long quest for weapons of mass destruction. The alternative is military action against Tehran’s nuclear facilities, or the regime itself, to eliminate any chance of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapons power.

By agreeing to further negotiations next week, President Trump’s delegation took at least one step down the first path. This will prove to be a serious, perhaps deadly, mistake.

The Obama and Biden administrations also followed the first path, leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, perhaps the most flawed international agreement in American history. The deal’s central error was allowing Iran to continue enriching uranium, with an illusory commitment not to advance to weapons-building. Iran’s conduct since 2015, particularly extensive weaponization activities, is graphic proof that its strategic objective was and remains achieving nuclear-weapons production capabilities.

The first Trump presidency withdrew from Obama’s deal in 2018, but failed to take the next critical steps. Although declaring a campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran, the pressure was obviously inadequate. Trump himself never embraced the only sure way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, namely overthrowing the ayatollahs or destroying their program by kinetic action. Even today, we do not know what Trump has the resolve to do.

We do know Tehran is reeling, and thus delighted to start endless negotiations to buy time to save its nuclear program. Israel is decimating Iran’s terrorist proxies. Syria’s Assad regime has fallen. Last October, Israel crippled Iran’s ballistic-missile manufacturing facilities and destroyed its Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses, and later, after Assad’s fall, the S-300’s in Syria. Of course the ayatollahs want a break, which is why they have offered an “interim” nuclear agreement(https://www.axios.com/2025/04/10/iran-nuclear-deal-us-interim-agreement) and asked for sanctions relief during negotiations(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-iran-begin-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-oman-fc07cdce?mod=hp_lead_pos5), both ploys to create even more delay.

Special Envoy Steven Witkoff, leading America’s delegation to Oman, said beforehand that Saturday’s meeting was “about trust building(https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/steve-witkoff-interview-iran-nuclear-talks-e41e0114?mod=hp_lead_pos11).” But there is no trust to be built with the ayatollahs. They have consistently sought the best of both worlds, committing to abandon their quest for nuclear weapons in exchange for tangible benefits like relief from sanctions, but never actually doing so. Iran has followed North Korea’s playbook, which has certainly worked well for Pyongyang. It is nothing less than madness for the US to repeat that mistake.

Witkoff says that “our position begins with dismantlement….That is our position today…,” but there might be “other ways to find compromise.” Earlier, he said “We should create a verification program, so that nobody worries about [Iranian] weaponization….” These positions are all flatly wrong. There is, or should be, no compromise on denuclearization. It is not just Washington’s beginning position, but the middle and ending position as well. The 2015 deal’s verification terms were utterly inadequate, as Tehran’s continuing progress in weaponization, among other things, proves. More Iranian progress will come while the talks continue. The only acceptable verification program would necessarily be so intrusive and transparent it would threaten the very viability of the ayatollahs’ regime. If Iran isn’t prepared strategically to denuclearize, and to prove it palpably, not just verbally, then destroying the nuclear program or the regime itself are the only alternatives.

To be clear, what Witkoff is describing is the Obama-Biden policy. If that is what he signaled in Oman on Saturday, then Trump has done a U-turn even more dramatic than last week’s about-face on tariffs. To be clearer still, the result of such a contemporary Obama-Biden-Trump policy will be at least as harmful to America and its Middle East allies as the original model.

Israel and the Gulf Arab states have known this for years. They need no education on the threats Iran poses. Instead, they are quietly taking military steps to prepare their defenses. In a little-noticed but potentially significant military exercise(https://www.newsweek.com/arabs-israel-trump-uae-qatar-iran-aircraft-2053399) recently hosted by Greece, Israeli aircraft participated for the first time ever with Qatari and UAE air-force planes. Carrying potential political perils for all three nations, the foundational, if unspoken, reason for joint exercises was their common adversary, Iran.

Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu argues correctly that the only acceptable deal is “one modeled after Libya’s, where the U.S. goes in, dismantles the facilities, and destroys the equipment under its own supervision.” Otherwise, “the alternative is military action, and everyone knows it(https://thehill.com/policy/international/5238270-netanyahu-iran-nuclear-facilities/).” Trump should trust America’s friends, not its enemies.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on April 14, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Ukraine, Trump and the Middle East

Posted on March 17, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Donald Trump’s jarring Oval Office confrontation with Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky symbolizes what is wrong with Trump’s dysfunctional approach to foreign policy. In what seemed like a television comedy show, Trump accused Zelensky of everything from risking World War III to having no cards to play in defending his homeland from Russia’s unprovoked aggression. Trump then kicked Zelensky out of the West Wing without even providing lunch. Most American children are raised to be more polite to their guests. The real meaning of the Oval Office debacle, however, does not turn on who committed the worst breaches of etiquette. Instead, Trump’s evident hostility toward Zelensky reflected the reversal of America’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian war, from supporting Ukraine to effectively supporting Russia. Recent US history provides nothing remotely comparable to Trump’s about-face. Trump, of course, contends he is merely seeking peace to stop what he called in his State of the Union address the “senseless” war in Europe’s center. Of course, neither Russia nor Ukraine consider the war “senseless,” albeit for very different reasons. The Kremlin is fighting to recreate the Russian empire, a goal Putin announced as far back as 2005, whereas Ukraine is defending its freedom and independence. Americans once fought for freedom and independence, and certainly didn’t consider it “senseless.” What explains Trump’s emphasis on rapidly ending the conflict, and his sympathy for Moscow? He has frequently said that if he has good personal relations with a foreign head of state, then America has good relations with that leader’s country. Conversely, if his personal relations with a foreign leader are bad, then US relations with his country are bad. Personal relations have a place in international affairs, as in all things, but they are not decisive factors in national-security decision-making, especially for the world’s hard men like Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, or North Korea’s Kim Jung Un. These authoritarians are cold-blooded and clear-eyed in knowing what their national interest are, and they pursue those interests unhesitatingly. Trump, by contrast, pursues his personal interest. He thinks Putin, Xi, and Kim are his friends, even saying(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/we-fell-in-love-trump-and-kim-shower-praise-stroke-egos-on-path-to-nuclear-negotiations/2019/02/24/46875188-3777-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html) he and Kim “fell in love.” In the case of Ukraine, that explains Trump’s tilt toward Putin and against Zelensky: Trump wants the war, which he considers Biden’s responsibility, behind him so that Moscow-Washington relations will improve. During the 2024 campaign, Trump said repeatedly that the war would never have begun had he been President. Based on my own observations, Putin, reflecting his KGB training and skills, does not think he and Trump are friends. Rather, Trump is an easy mark, to be manipulated to achieve Moscow’s objectives. In short, the Kremlin sees Trump as what Vladimir Lenin once called a “useful idiot,” meaning he can be made to serve Russian purposes without realizing what he is doing. As part of his ongoing manipulation, Putin recently agreed the war in Ukraine would not have occurred under a Trump presidency(https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/24/world/putin-trump-ukraine-crisis-talks-intl/index.html). Putin continued the manipulation by releasing Marc Foley, an American hostage held in Moscow, followed by Belarus releasing another US hostage, and much more. The game continues, as reflected by Putin’s conditional acceptance of the Saudi-brokered cease-fire between Washington and Kyiv. Putin doesn’t want to endanger the concessions Trump has already made to him, so he carefully accepted the cease-fire in principle, only to obscure it with conditions and modifications. Despite this carefully muddled answer, Trump was enthusiastic, saying it was “very good and productive(https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-calls-for-trump-putin-talks-on-ukraine-war-4dd35ede).” The Kremlin must have celebrated its success. What does Trump himself want? He wants the Nobel Peace Prize. After all, Barack Obama won the 2009 Nobel for no particular reason, just months after assuming office. Under Nobel’s prize rules, nominations for a given year must be submitted by January 31 of that year(https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/nobel-peace-prize/nomination/), meaning Obama’s nominations had to be received eleven days after his Inauguration, making the award laughable. Trump may not realize it is already too late for him to win this year, but he still craves the faded glory of a Nobel prize. The likely next step on Ukraine is direct Trump-Putin talks, which Trump clearly wants as soon as possible. Putin also wants direct negotiations because it provides an opportunity to manipulate Trump directly, rather than through intermediaries. Moreover, by definition, their conversation would exclude Ukraine and the Europeans from the real dealmaking, which won’t bother Trump as all. While there is no certainty to the outcome of this coming conversation, all signs point to a result heavily skewed in Moscow’s favor. The lesson for the Middle East goes straight to the question, how to deal with Trump? He is not pursuing some American grand strategy or playing sophisticated three-dimensional chess. He is pursuing a Trump-centric strategy in two dimensions, one move at a time. Keep that in mind, pile on some personal flattery of Trump, add pomp and circumstance, and who knows what Trump will be prepared to give away? This article was first published in Independent Arabia on March 17, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump’s Gaza Dreaming

Posted on February 10, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Donald Trump’s remarks on the Gaza Strip after his February 4 meeting with Israeli Prime Minster Bibi Netanyahu precipitated enormous controversy and confusion. They were not idle musings, but written in advance. Typically, Trump wandered off-script, speculating about using US military force in Gaza, which White House handlers walked back the next day. Trump himself then promptly walked back the walk-back, insisting he was serious about American control of Gaza, although without force. (For the record, I have never advocated deploying the US military in Gaza.)

The ensuing furor has obscured the reality that Trump addressed two vastly different issues. First, and most bizarrely, he asserted that Israel would hand control of Gaza to the US, which would “own” it, and make it “the Riviera of the Middle East.” Second, and far more important, was Trump’s contention that resettling Gaza’s population in the Strip was the wrong way forward, at least near-term. This distinction is critical to evaluating Trump’s statements, until changes positions again, perhaps while you read this article.

Trump’s first idea is not going to happen. It springs from no underlying philosophy, national-security grand strategy, or consistent forward-looking policy. It derives instead from his first-term pitch to North Korean leader Kim Jung Un that his country’s untouched beaches could become major resort areas. That did not materialize, but the dream never died.

Wild as it was for North Korea, it is even more so in Gaza. The aphorism “capital is a coward” is directly applicable. Because of the ongoing cease-fire/hostage exchange, Hamas is reasserting control in Gaza, suggesting it may not be as debilitated by Israeli military action as initially thought. In turn, that means Israel will likely resume hostilities, rightly so, when the exchanges end. Until Gaza is fully secure, capital and labor necessary to build the Middle East’s Riviera, will be few and far between. “Gaza” itself is an historical accident, reflecting military reality at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, simply a part of the ancient Mediterranean path leading to Egypt. Standing alone, it is not economically viable as far as the eye can see.

Trump’s second suggestion about Gaza’s future is not new, having emanated from multiple sources long before his February 4 comments. If adopted, it would fundamentally, permanently alter the Middle East. Among other things, it would be the final death knell for the “two-state” solution. Well before Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack, the two-state solution had become simply an incantation. Afterwards, in Israel, it all but disappeared as a serious proposition. Nonetheless, absent any serious effort to create an alternative, the mantra has remained the default position.

Those days are over. The fundamental problem with the putative Palestinian “state” was its artificiality, a legacy of radical Arab leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nassar; its lack of any economic basis; and its susceptibility to terrorist control. Nonetheless, if the two-state concept is dead, we must find an alternative. I once proposed a “three-state” solution: returning Gaza to Egypt, with Israel and Jordan dividing sovereignty over the West Bank. This approach would safeguard Israeli security while also settling Palestinians in viable economies, with real futures.

Palestinians, however, have for decades been so abused by the region’s radical, post-colonial ideologies that neither Cairo nor Amman welcomed having potentially subversive populations come under their jurisdictions. But the palpable difficulty of resolving the Palestinian issue should not lead regional states and concerned outside powers to fall back to reconstructing high-rise refugee camps in Gaza. So doing, involving enormous costs in clearing the rubble and unexploded ordnance, not to mention eliminating the Hamas tunnel network, and then reconstruction itself, would inevitably lead to another October 7. That is obviously unacceptable.

There is an alternative, however, namely changing the way Palestinians have been treated for over seven decades. UNRWA, the UN’s Palestine relief agency, which is functionally an arm of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, should be abolished, and responsibility for Palestinian refugees transferred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In turn, UNHCR should follow its basic humanitarian doctrine, under which refugees are either repatriated to their country of origin, or, if that is not possible, resettled in other countries. There is nothing forcible about UNHCR resettlement, since both refugees and recipient countries must agree. But it is also true that, unlike UNRWA, UNHCR refugee camps do not last forever.

This is not to the detriment of Palestinians. Exactly the opposite. It means they will receive the same humanitarian treatment as every other refugee population since World War II. As difficult as switching to the UNHCR model may be, Trump’s comments, the first such by a major world leader, may finally ignite the debate that must occur to find a lasting home for the Gaza Palestinians.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on February 10, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Ignore Trump’s Gaza distraction. Focus on Iran

Posted on February 5, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with President Donald Trump, the first post-inaugural White House visit by a foreign leader, could shape the Middle East for generations. Pre-meeting speculation centered on how the leaders would handle the Hamas-Israel war.

Stunningly, Trump’s comments just before and then after his meeting with Netanyahu focused on the U.S. taking control of the Gaza Strip while Gaza’s residents are resettled elsewhere in the Middle East. There is little point in commenting seriously on this “idea,” which appears to be entirely Trump’s own.

The most important strategic issue in the real Middle East remains Iran’s existential threat to Israel. Tehran’s ayatollahs can only be delighted if the Trump administration expends any time and effort at all on the Gaza idea rather than addressing their nuclear weapons program. Restoring the “maximum pressure” campaign from Trump’s first term is a sound decision, but still only the beginning of an effective strategy.

Since Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Israel, with U.S. assistance, has dealt Iran and its “ring of fire” strategy major blows. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated but not destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities and its sophisticated, Russian-supplied, S-300 air-defense systems have been all but eliminated. Syria’s Iran-friendly Assad regime has fallen, and its S-300 systems and other military assets have been destroyed. Unfortunately, the Houthis in Yemen, West Bank terrorists, and Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq are only wounded, and not severely.

The job is unfinished, but enormous progress has been made to diminish Iran’s overall threat, especially its terrorist surrogates. The existential danger remains: Its nuclear program is essentially intact, with only one location, the Parchin weaponization facility, attacked. Looking ahead, the central issue remains how to destroy Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts, which threaten not only Israel but also constitute a major proliferation threat to America and the world.

Eliminating this menace is Netanyahu’s real top priority, but it should not be solely Jerusalem’s responsibility. The United States is the only country that can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological as well as nuclear). For America and Israel, there has never been a better time to do just that, using carefully targeted force against Iran’s nuclear arms facilities.

Accordingly, Israeli-American objectives should be victory against both Iran’s nuclear and terrorist threats. In World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained to his countrymen why this was the only acceptable outcome: “victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

The real debate is between those advocating victory and those advocating the Obama-Biden approach: endless negotiations on an elusive deal to return Iran’s government to civilized behavior. There are certainly legitimate questions about the timing of striking Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Most important is reducing Iran’s capacity to retaliate against Israel, friendly Gulf Arab states, and deployed U.S. forces in the region. In Lebanon, Hezbollah likely retains tens of thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, and Iran itself still has significant numbers of missiles and drones. The clock is running. Tehran is racing to repair the production facilities Israel leveled in October 2024 to replenish its missile stockpiles.

Another mutual priority is achieving Israel’s objective of eliminating the political and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as Netanyahu stressed yesterday. Although Israel has enjoyed remarkable success in Gaza and Lebanon, the recent Gaza hostage releases were staged to portray Hamas as a viable fighting force, with considerable support among Gaza’s civilians. Yet under former President Joe Biden’s ceasefire deal, which Trump’s pre-inaugural pressure on Netanyahu ironically brought to fruition, Israeli negotiations with Hamas over Gaza’s future are due to start. Yet this is precisely what Netanyahu wanted to avoid and why Biden failed for seven months to close the deal. Just because it is now Trump’s deal does not improve it substantively.

Hamas can have no part in any future Gaza, whatever it looks like, nor can Hezbollah have any future in Lebanon. Only by removing these cancers can Gazans and Lebanese have any prospect of normality. And so long as the ayatollahs rule in Tehran, they will do their best to rearm their terrorist proxies, even under “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Following their summit, Netanyahu and Trump must demonstrate the resolve to persevere, as Churchill said, however long and hard the road may be. Watch what happens on Iran.

This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on February 5, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and the Middle East

Posted on January 28, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

History in the Middle East is moving very fast these days. The long-overdue fall of Syria’s Assad regime is only the latest evidence, and Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration will accelerate the pace. The central question is whether the principal players seize opportunities now open for lasting regional peace and security before they quickly close. Of course, there are massive, daunting uncertainties, but leaders should remember the Roman saying, “fortune favors the bold.”

Surprisingly, one of the major uncertainties could be Trump. In his first term, he was viewed as automatically pro-Israel, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over disputed territory in the Golan Heights. It would be wrong for several reasons, however, to assume reflexively that this pattern will recur during his second term.

For example, Trump’s private view of Netanyahu is far more negative than generally perceived, exemplified by Trump’s anger when Netanyahu congratulated Biden on winning the 2020 presidential election(https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-jerusalem-israel-middle-east-iran-nuclear-d141ca03a5e38bfb60b37f94a38ecda8). To most of the world, this was hardly noteworthy, but Trump’s fixation never to be perceived as a loser forced him to argue that the Democrats stole the election, which mythology Netanyahu violated. Even before that, Trump said in an interview that he thought the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas wanted peace more than Netanyahu(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lq1seiWI8ro), which hardly expresses confidence in the Israeli leader. Moreover, Netanyahu is an expert politician, far more astute than Trump, which undoubtedly also inflames Trump’s vanity.

Moreover, Trump’s obsession to seek a deal on anything and everything, even with Iran’s ayatollahs, may come to dominate his Middle East actions. As I previously recounted in The Room Where It Happened, Trump came remarkably close to meeting Iran’s then-Foreign Minister, Javid Zarif, at the August, 2019, G-7 summit in Biarritz, France. French President Emmanuel Macron suggested such an encounter to Trump immediately upon his arrival in Biarritz, and he was initially inclined to agree. Conferring in Trump’s hotel room with Jared Kushner and White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvanery, I urged against meeting with Zarif. Trump ultimately did not see Zarif, but, as the Duke of Wellington said of Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo, it was “the nearest run thing you ever saw.”

Trump’s pre-Inauguration intervention in Joe Biden’s long effort to obtain a cease-fire/hostage-release deal between Hamas and Israel is also noteworthy. After seven months of failure, Trump’s pressure on Israel resulted in Netanyahu finally accepting Biden’s deal, or at least its first phase. Trump wanted to take credit for the hostage releases, hearkening back to the start of Ronald Reagan’s administration, when Iran returned US embassy officials taken hostage during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. On that level, Trump succeeded where Biden failed. But whether Trump understands Biden’s plan has other phases is far from certain, as are the prospects that even the first phase will conclude successfully, let alone those that follow.

Improbably, however, there have been signs, before and after Trump’s Inauguration, that he may believe that the Gaza war has actually ended. Steve Witkoff, his family friend and now a special Middle East envoy, has stresses that “phase two” of Biden’s deal, which involves further negotiation between Israel and Hamas, should begin promptly. This can hardly be what Israel expects. In addition, Witkoff’s Trumpian “zeal for the deal” mentality, and his inexperience, reflected in naïve public comments(https://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-envoy-says-gaza-ceasefire-could-pave-way-mideast-normalization-deal-inflection-point), are factors that could militate against Israel in the immediate future. Impressed by Witkoff’s performance to date, Trump may have decided to give him a role in Iran matters, although that remains unclear(https://www.axios.com/2025/01/23/trump-witkoff-iran-diplomacy-nuclear-deal). Nonetheless, both have said they favored diplomatic options to resolve Iran’s nuclear threat.

If true, this creates a dilemma for Netanyahu. Right now, Israel and America have the best opportunity ever to destroy Iran’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs. Israel has already massively damaged Iran’s missile-production facilities(https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production) and at least one target involved in weaponizing highly enriched uranium(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility), not to mention flattening Iran’s sophisticated, Russia-supplied, S-300 air defense systems(https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-s-attack-on-iran-has-left-tehran-offensively-and-defensively-weaker/7848701.html). Additional attacks in Syria after Assad’s overthrow have opened an air corridor allowing direct access from Israel to Iran. The path is clear.

Obstacles remain, notably Iran’s and Hezbollah’s remaining ballistic missiles, which would enable either retaliatory strikes against Israel, or even a pre-emptive strike to foreclose Netanyahu’s options. Israel, Jordan, and nearby Arab states must also worry about the current regime in Damascus, led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (“HTS”) terrorist group. Having shed his nom de guerre, and changed from combat fatigues to suits and ties, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing his best to convince outsiders that he now simply seeks responsible government in Syria. Whether this is true remains unclear, as do Turkish aspirations in Syria and across the region. The Biden administration(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/01/24/us-syria-intelligence-hts-isis/) reportedly went so far as to share intelligence with HTS about ISIS, although whether Trump will continue this risky business is unknown.

What is inescapable is that while Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities have never been more vulnerable, Trump’s new administration seemed undecided on its future course. His first term may not be an accurate prediction of his second. There is no Trumpian grand strategy at work here since he does not do grand strategy. Instead, he is transactional, episodic, and ad hoc, often making decisions based on whatever the last person he consults with recommends. This may be the real future of America’s policy in the Middle East.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on January 28, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Negotiating Advice for Ukraine Supporters

Posted on January 13, 2025 by Bolton PAC Staff

During the 2024 campaign, candidate Donald Trump said he could resolve the Ukraine war in twenty-four hours by getting together with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky to thrash things out. At a January 7 press conference, President-elect Trump conceded it could take up to six months. Call that learning.

Trump fundamentally wants the war to disappear. He has said repeatedly it would never have occurred had he been President, as he has also said about the ongoing Middle East conflict. Of course, these statements are, by definition, neither provable nor disprovable, but they reflect his visceral feeling that the wars are Biden’s problem and should disappear when Biden does.

Neither war will disappear so quickly, but Trump’s comments strongly suggest that he is indifferent to the terms on which they end. That is likely bad news for Ukraine, though it could be good news for Israel in its struggle against Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy. As Inauguration Day nears, there is precious little information publicly available about what Trump will actually do. And, because he has neither a coherent philosophy nor a strategic approach to foreign affairs, what he says in the morning may not apply in the afternoon.

Accordingly, those concerned for Ukrainian and Western security should focus clearly on what is negotiable with Moscow and what is not. Early decisions on the central components of potential diplomacy can have far-reaching implications that the parties will inevitably try to turn to their benefit. Ukraine especially must make several key decisions about how to proceed. Consider the following.

Although a cease-fire linked to commencing negotiations may be inevitable because of pressure from Trump, such a cease-fire is not necessarily in Ukraine’s interest. Talking while fighting was a successful strategy for the Chinese Communist Party in its struggle against the Kuomintang during and after World War II. It could work for Ukraine today under certain conditions. Most important, of course, is the continued supply of adequate military assistance, which is questionable with Trump in office.

But a cease fire can be more perilous for Ukraine than for Russia: the longer negotiations take, the more likely it is the cease-fire lines become permanent, a new border between Ukraine and Russia far into the future. As negotiations proceed, the absence of hostilities will provide opportunities for Moscow to seek full or at least partial easing of economic sanctions, which many Europeans seem poised to concede. Moreover, once hostilities stop, they are far harder politically to resume, which is also likely to Ukraine’s disadvantage. Although Russia would probably win an indefinite war of attrition, it also needs time to rebuild its debilitated military and economy. A cease fire affords that opportunity, and thereby buys time for Russia to heal its wounds and prepare the next attack. Russia waited eight years after its 2014 offensive, and can afford to wait again until the West is distracted elsewhere.

If Trump insists on a cease-fire-in-place and contemporaneous negotiations, Ukraine must be careful to avoid having the talks aim at a permanent solution rather than a temporary accommodation. Russia will see any deal as temporary in any case, no matter what it says publicly. Vladimir Putin obsesses over reincorporating Ukraine into a new Russian empire, and each slice of territory Russia takes back brings that goal closer. Negotiating an “end” to the war plays into the Kremlin’s hands, since it provides the false impression to gullible Westerners that there is no risk of future aggression.

Both the cease-fire issue and the duration of any deal raise two other questions: should there be “peacekeepers” along the cease-fire line, and should Ukraine insist on “security guarantees” from the West (NATO or otherwise) against future Russian aggression?

Peacekeeping is operationally complex, and rarely successful in any sense other than helping prolong a military stalemate. That is nearly the uniform outcome of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping forces (like UNIFIL in Lebanon or UNDOF on the Golan Heights) simply become part of the landscape, in peace or war. The Security Council loses interest in resolving the sources of the underlying conflict. The peacekeepers become irrelevant, as recent developments along the cease-fire line between Israel and Syria demonstrate. In short, peacekeepers are essentially only hollow symbols.

Indeed, it is the recognition of UN ineffectiveness that has likely inspired calls for deploying NATO peacekeepers along the Ukraine-Russia line-of-control. But does anyone expect Russia to agree meekly? Will Moscow not suggest peacekeepers from Iran or North Korea along with NATO? Moreover, there has been little discussion about what a peacekeeping force’s rules of engagement would be, whether deployed by the UN or NATO. Would these rules be typical of UN operation, where the peacekeepers can only use force only in self-defense? Or would the rules be more robust, allowing force in aid of their mission? Really? In aid of their mission, NATO peacekeepers would be allowed to use force against Russian troops? Or Ukrainian troops? In such circumstances, potential troop-contributing countries would make themselves very scarce.

Future security guarantees for Ukraine, which it is insisting upon, are unfortunately likely to be blue smoke and mirrors. Russia has repeatedly said that NATO membership — the only security guarantee that really matters — is a deal-breaker. European Union security guarantees? Good luck with that. Security guarantees by individual nations? That was the approach of the Budapest agreements on returning Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia; they didn’t work out so well. In short, “security guarantees” are mellifluous words, but evanescent without US and NATO participation, which Trump seems unlikely to endorse.

Negotiations are looming primarily because Trump wants the war to go away. Europe is too tired and too incapable of charting a different course. Contemplating these depressing scenarios, therefore, Ukraine and its supporters may have little choice but to acquiesce in talks on unfavorable terms. For that very reason, Kyiv should be very cautious on what it agrees with Trump.

This article was first published in 19fortyfive on January 12, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

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